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11 JUNE 1987

ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA Carries L'UNITA Interview With Gorbachev (Editorial; PRAVDA, 20 May 87).....	1
Soviet Delegation in Geneva Issues Statement (APN DAILY REVIEW, 11 May 87).....	7
XINHUA Calls INF 'Political Chip' in Strategic Struggle (Ren Zhengde; XINHUA, 4 May 87).....	9

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: U.S. Draft Treaty Contradicts Reykjavik (AFP, 12 May 87; Moscow to North America, 16 May 87).....	11
Foreign Ministry Spokesman	11
Broadcast to North America, by Vladimir Pozner, et al.	12

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR's Karpov on 'Key Provisions' Needed for Summit (V. Karpov; PRAVDA, 19 May 87).....	17
USSR's Vorontsov on Western Reaction to Arms Proposals (Yuliy Vorontsov; LE FIGARO, 13 May 87).....	23

Turkish Paper Interviews Soviet Aide (Yuriy Gremitskikh Interview; HURRIYET, 3 May 87).....	25
USSR: Western Politicians Do Not 'Dare' To Agree (Yu. Soldatenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 May 87).....	28
USSR: NATO Leaders 'Always Opposed' To Zero Option (Manki Ponomarev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 May 87).....	31
USSR: Western Differences Over Zero Option Viewed (Nikolay Shishlin; Moscow Domestic Service, 17 May 87)....	34
Moscow 'International Situation: Questions and Answers' (Konstantin Patsyuk, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 15 May 87).....	35
Moscow Weekly 'International Observers Roundtable' (Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 17 May 87).....	38
Moscow TV Documentary on 'Nuclear Threat' in Europe (Boris Kalyagin; Moscow Television Service, 15 May 87)....	44
Moscow TV: U.S. To Expand Nuclear Presence in Britain (Valeriy Korzin; Moscow Television Service, 13 May 87)....	47
Spain's Gonzalez, Belgium's Martens Agree on Euromissiles (Fernando Baeta; DIARIO 16, 30 Apr 87).....	48
BEIJING REVIEW Calls U.S. Reservations 'Main Block' (Wan Di; BEIJING REVIEW, 27 Apr 87).....	49
PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY on Western Europe Strengthening Defense (Yao Li; RENMIN RIBAO, 1 May 87).....	51
PRC Journal Analyzes Soviet 'Zero Option' Plan (Li Qinggong; LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION, No 19, 11 May 87).....	53
PRC Premier on Common Interests of China, Western Europe (Beijing Domestic Service, 11 May 87).....	57
CHINA DAILY on Threat of Asian-Based Missiles (CHINA DAILY, 15 May 87).....	58
XINHUA on FRG's Kohl Concerned Over INF Developments (Xia Zhimian; XINHUA, 17 May 87).....	60

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Iranians Say Italian Company Supplies Chemical Weapons (ANSA, 23 Apr 87).....	62
--	----

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: Jaruzelski Plan for European Arms Cuts Praised (Various sources, various dates).....	63
Foreign Ministry Spokesman, by Gennadiy Gerasimov	63
Commentary in PRAVDA, by Yevgeniy Grigoryev	65
TASS Cites PAP Report	66
Foreign Ministry Press Briefing	67
NATO-Warsaw Pact 'Unofficial Consultations' in Vienna Continue (TASS, 18 May 87).....	68
Soviet Army Paper Argues NATO-Warsaw Pact Parity Exists (Yu. Borin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 Feb 87).....	69
Austrian Daily Interviews Soviet General on Convention Balance (Erich Feichtinger; VOLKSSTIMME, 13 May 87).....	72
USSR: History, Achievements of CD Surveyed (A. Kotlyarenko; RABOCHAYA GAZETA, 13 Mar 87).....	74
Briefs	
Poland's Orzechowski Addresses CSCE Meeting	78

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

Moscow Blames Radiation Increase on U.S. Tests (Yuriy Solton; Moscow World Service, 9 May 87).....	79
Briefs	
New Round of Soviet-U.S. Talks	81

RELATED ISSUES

Mexican Foreign Secretary Discusses Arms Issues in Moscow (TASS, 4, 5 May 87; PRAVDA, 6, 8 May 87).....	82
Meets With Gromyko	82
Views Issues With Shevardnadze	83
Luncheon Speeches Reported	84
Joint Communique Issued	86
PRAVDA on Move to 'New Thinking' in Security Issues (Yuriy Zhukov; PRAVDA, 12 May 87).....	90

Warsaw Pact Initiatives Recalled on 32d Anniversary (TASS, 11, 12 May 87).....	94
TASS Commentator, by Vladimir Bogachev Deputy Chief of Staff	94 96
Soviet Admiral Discusses Soviet, U.S. Naval Policies (N. I. Smirnov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 May 87).....	97
PRC Envoy to UN Urges U.S., USSR To Lead in Disarmament (XINHUA, 7 May 87).....	101
PRC UN Working Paper on Conventional Disarmament (XINHUA, 9 May 87).....	103

/12223

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA CARRIES L'UNITA INTERVIEW WITH GORBACHEV

PM191621 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 87 First Edition pp 1-3

["M.S. Gorbachev's Replies to Questions by the L'UNITA Editorial Office"]

[Excerpts] Some time ago the editorial office of the Italian Communist Party [PCI] newspaper L'UNITA asked M.S. Gorbachev to grant it an interview.

On 18 May, M.S. Gorbachev received in the Kremlin Comrade G. Chiaromonte, member of the PCI Directorate and chief editor of the newspaper L'UNITA; Deputy Chief Editor Comrade R. Foa; and Comrade G. Chiesa, the newspaper's Moscow correspondent, and presented them with replies to the questions submitted in advance.

An animated, friendly conversation took place, whose contents are reproduced below.

M.S. Gorbachev: I am glad to welcome you, Comrade Chiaromonte, and the other Italian comrades. I received your written questions for the interview, and worked hard on the answers. You asked very many questions, by the way. I have answered virtually all of them. But I did leave something for the next interview. (animation)

The following are answers which M.S. Gorbachev conveyed to the Italian comrades in written form.

Question: You said recently that tourism is not your profession, and so you could go to the United States only if a real prospect emerges of concluding an agreement in the disarmament sphere. Could you indicate the main questions on which you believe it is necessary to come to an agreement at a possible summit meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States? Do you think, in particular, that there is now a tangible prospect of attaining an agreement with the United States on medium-range missiles?

Answer: As far as tourism is concerned, that is correct. But realism -- that is an essential characteristic that should be inherent in every politician.

The whole range of questions of lessening military tension and confrontation in the world cannot be resolved immediately and simultaneously, but it is necessary to start somewhere.

At present the question most ripe for resolving is indisputably the elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and their severe limitation in the Asian part of the USSR and on U.S. territory.

Reaching agreement on this and signing the first agreement in history on the radical reduction, the almost total elimination, of an entire class of nuclear weapons is an entirely realistic possibility. It is also quite possible to define "key provisions" concerning strategic offensive arms, ABM, and nuclear tests.

Only a few weeks ago it appeared that as a result of the Soviet side's rapid advance toward the positions of the United States and its West European allies, an agreement was only a few steps away.

Indeed, the foundations for this agreement were jointly defined by President Reagan and me back in Reykjavik; there was the desire, especially on the part of West European countries, that we agree to separate the elimination of medium-range missiles from the total package -- we did so; concern arose over inequality in operational and tactical missiles on the European continent -- we agreed to the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. weapons in this class in Europe.

Probably not only we ourselves, but the majority of people throughout Europe and worldwide thought that the attainment of a final accord was, so to speak, a technicality.

But it turns out that certain governments in Western Europe have not yet decided for themselves whether they want the elimination of Soviet medium-range missiles, if the U.S. ones are to be eliminated at the same time.

We have observed that some people are trying to create an endless chain of more and more new connections. First they said that the question of medium-range missiles cannot be resolved without the simultaneous elimination of operational and tactical missiles, then they started to add in tactical nuclear weapons, battlefield nuclear weapons, and then also conventional arms and armed forces. In general terms, all these are serious matters, and it is well known that we have spoken out on them together with our allies. And we are prepared to discuss them and resolve them.

But in our opinion these problems must not be used for all kinds of procrastination. All the same, we think political realism will prevail. Too much is at stake, it is a question of matters which are too significant for mankind. As for those who hesitate, let me remind them of Seneca's dictum: When a man does not know to what haven he steers, no wind will be a fair wind for him.

The opportunity which has opened up must not be lost. The attainment of an agreement will facilitate the path to the resolution of many other problems of ending the arms race and of disarmament. We set forth our idea of the paths and stages toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the beginning of the 21st century in the well known 15 January 1986 Statement.

It is on this basis that we act on disarmament questions. We are improving our proposals in each avenue so that they incorporate useful ideas and considerations from other states. In many avenues talks are already under way, some of which -- those on chemical weapons, for instance -- are at an advanced stage.

Question: In the Political Report to the 27th CPSU Congress and in subsequent speeches you have insisted on the need to recognize the interdependence which links the systems of East and West, North and South in the present era. This is a new vision of the world, which brings cooperation between different social systems to the forefront. Could you develop your thoughts on this question?

Answer: You are quite right. It was the 27th CPSU Congress which drew conclusions of very great theoretical and political importance:

-- As a result of 4 decades of the nuclear arms race, mankind finds himself literally facing a dilemma of survival;

-- The present world, for all its diverse and contradictory nature, is increasingly interconnected, interdependent, and to a significant degree an integral whole.

It follows from this that the path to the creation of the lasting, nuclear-free peace that is so badly wanted by the peoples, who are tired of confrontation, who are suffocated by it, the path to a nonviolent world in which everyone would retain his own philosophical, ideological, political, and religious views -- that path lies in talks between states and the joint elaboration of accords on the central points on the international agenda, and first and foremost on questions of disarmament. This will require states to renew the practices of international relations and diplomacy in line with the new way of thinking.

There is much here that is out of the ordinary. Remember, for instance, how often talks on disarmament have begun. But states have often tacitly proceeded on the basis that although it would be good to reach agreement, if that does not prove possible, it will not be so very terrible. But now we are all obliged to realize that it is terrible, that mankind cannot be allowed to take further steps toward the brink of nonexistence. Life dictates that we agree to begin to move in the opposite direction.

This is now the categorical imperative of politics and diplomacy. We formulate our international policy in precisely this spirit.

Of course, we also know our restructuring in the foreign policy, our call for a new way of thinking, is far from being to everyone's liking in the West. It is becoming increasingly clear where the main seats of opposition lie, and who would like to create a front for the struggle against new approaches in foreign policy.

Without overcoming the opposition of those who cling to the old policy of strength and the obsolete stereotypes in East-West relations, one can hardly count on a radical improvement in international relations or on ensuring a lasting, secure peace.

The other side of the matter is that an abrupt turnabout in historical development endangers a great many new questions, and ready answers to all these questions are not available. But given good will and understanding, we can and must find answers to them, by collective efforts.

Now that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries propose to work toward a nuclear-free world, the question arises: In that case will not mankind go back to the situation which existed before World Wars I and II, when nuclear weapons did not exist, but military conflicts were unleashed and took many tens of millions of lives? How, we are asked, do you propose to ensure security and nonviolence in a world where there will be no nuclear weapons?

This is no idle question. But we will never agree that nuclear weapons should be deemed a reliable means of preserving peace. [paragraph continues]

It is our conviction that in a nuclear-free world powerful politico-legal mechanisms for regulating international relations must be created and function. Their creation is the common task of all states -- nuclear and nonnuclear, developed and developing. Here an important place will obviously belong to the United Nations, whose role and significance, in our opinion, must grow.

In general, we would welcome the commencement of international dialogue on the substance of the entire range of questions of a comprehensive security system in a nuclear-free world, given an adequate minimum of arms, the structure of which would be determined by purely defensive needs.

If you look at world affairs from the human angle, there is scarcely anything more urgent today than the humanization of politics. Nuclear disarmament is also fundamentally a question of humanism, and even primarily of humanism.

This way of looking at the matter calls into being new approaches to the resolution of international affairs. Over the centuries politics has remained the preserve, so to speak, of the strong of this world. Even now it is still largely the lot of states and their leaders. But now, by no means only states. The leading social trend -- the shift toward democratization -- is declaring itself ever more loudly and convincingly in international political activity.

Our time has naturally been one in which the role of factors affecting all mankind in world affairs, the human measurement of politics, and the reconsideration of international relations from that viewpoint have generally increased. Our time is placing emphasis on the satisfaction of people's spiritual and material requirements, which have a common foundation, especially insofar as they relate to the preservation of life itself and the living environment for the Soviet Union, Italy, or any other country. We believe that this dominant humanist idea in politics will win increasing recognition.

This is also the essence of the new thinking, through the prism of which we regard humanitarian cooperation as an inalienable part of an all-embracing system of security on a par with political, economic, and ecological cooperation. Ensuring that people, that individuals are protected is the substance of the task. But people's social self-awareness also require protection, so that they feel that their freedoms are not fictitious, that society really does need them, their work, and their knowledge and will not abandon them in trouble, will provide them with housing, will not leave them to die of hunger, will take care of their children, and will guarantee at least a minimum of benefits.

I believe that it is precisely here that a common denominator can be found for the different approaches to human rights questions and to the social and humanitarian sphere as a whole.

Of course, no state or government is immune to making mistakes. But it is also true that, the more states associate with one another, the more open and sincere their intercourse becomes, and the more profoundly the new political thinking enters the minds of statesmen, the greater people's confidence will become that miscalculations and mistakes will be reduced.

Question: In your speeches and in recent Soviet positions on a number of questions we have been aware of new emphases as far as relations between the USSR and West Europe are concerned. It is no secret that some circles in the West fear lest the development of European detente drive a wedge into the Western countries' alliance and weaken the Europe-U.S. link. Some ascribe precisely that intention to the USSR. What can you tell us about that?

Answer: Relations with the West European countries really do occupy a special place in our international policy.

I think I am right in saying that in Europe -- despite all the sociopolitical and national-state variety there -- there is a growing trend toward further improvement of interstate relations in the East-West context. This is the effect of growing awareness of the contemporary world's realities, the high intellectual potential of European nations, and, at the same time, their historical experience which abounds in drama. This also goes to explain why the philosophy of the "all-European home" encounters increasing response and understanding. We strive to maintain the continuity and assertiveness of the all-European process.

As far as driving a wedge between West Europe and the United States, that is, to put it mildly, nonsense. We ourselves not only strive for cooperation with other states, but also believe that all states have the same right to cooperate with each other.

West Europe's historically developed ties with the United States or, let us say, the Soviet Union's relations with the European socialist countries are a political reality. It cannot but be taken into account if a realistic policy is to be built. Any other approach could disturb the prevailing equilibrium in Europe.

We are firmly convinced that Europe's future lies in lasting security with minimum arms on both sides, in broad interstate cooperation, in contacts and exchanges along all avenues and at all levels.

Question: How do you assess the prospects of economic and political relations between CEMA and the EEC?

Answer: I would answer this question briefly. CEMA and the EEC are now engaged in a joint quest for foundations of future relations of cooperation and have advanced in this work. In parallel with the establishment of CEMA-EEC relations, ties will begin to be established between their member countries and organs representing these associations. For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared to take this path and establish relations with the EEC. Once this happens, many interesting initiatives could be implemented.

Question: Signs of a new spirit in relations between the USSR and China have been emerging recently. Your speech in Vladivostok last year and also your visit to India confirmed that the Soviet Union strives for fully normalizing interstate relations with China. The withdrawal of a certain proportion of the Soviet troops from Mongolia served as an additional favorable signal. The Chinese, however, point to the situation in Cambodia as one of the chief obstacles to the full normalization of political relations. What is your opinion on this score?

Answer: You are right -- the Soviet Union is acting vigorously in a direction leading to the full normalization of relations between two major socialist countries -- the USSR and the PRC.

Trade, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural ties have been developing dynamically recently, and political consultations are being held on certain urgent international questions.

We attach great significance to the fact that the USSR and the PRC approach a number of major principled international questions from close positions. The Chinese leaders and we both emphasize that peace is needed to resolve internal tasks of social renewal.

Both countries have proclaimed that they will never be first to use nuclear weapons. We are resolutely opposed to the "Star Wars" program. China has a similar position. We are interested in everything the PRC does to regularize and modernize the economy, and we wholeheartedly wish the great neighboring people and the CPC successes in this difficult matter.

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CSO: 5200/1493

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA ISSUES STATEMENT

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 11 May 87 pp 1-2

[TASS item: "Statement of USSR Geneva Delegation"]

[Text] Geneva, May 8 (TASS)--The Soviet-US talks on nuclear and space arms continue in Geneva.

The Soviet delegation is conducting a consistent line at concluding successfully the preparation for a joint draft treaty on medium-range missiles, to ensure the advance at the talks in other directions. There exist for this the necessary objective conditions created by important arrangements reached by the leaders of the USSR and USA in Reykjavik as well as by the latest Soviet initiatives in all the areas discussed at the talks in Geneva.

On May 5 of this year, the USSR delegation took another constructive step: it tabled a proposal to coordinate "key provisions of agreements" on a number of major disarmament issues, including strategic offensive arms and consolidation of the regime of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Soviet side submitted a corresponding draft document. Alongside agreement on medium-range missiles, this document could become the subject and the main result of a political arrangement at summit level between the USSR and the USA and a basis on which full-scale juridically binding agreements could be drafted.

The Soviet delegation also proposed coordinating the principles of restraint in the area of strategic offensive arms, including long-range sea-based cruise missiles for the time of the talks. The point of the matter is that the sides should refrain from surpassing their present levels of strategic offensive arms. The meaning and importance of such a step are understandable. It would create a favourable climate for the work of the delegations, for the drafting of agreements on arms limitation and reduction.

The United States delegation has now submitted the US draft treaty on strategic offensive arms. It will be studied. A number of its provisions take into account the arrangement on radical reduction of strategic offensive arms of both sides reached in Reykjavik. But the most important element, the taking into consideration of the objectively existing relationship between cuts in strategic offensive arms and prevention of an arms race in space, consolidation of the ABM Treaty regime, is lacking in the US draft.

The Soviet delegation firmly stated in this connection that prevention of the transfer of the arms race to space, and keeping of the ABM Treaty are crucial to 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive arms. Therefore there must be a provision that if, in conditions of an arrangement to reduce strategic offensive arms, either party should adopt a decision to embark on practical creation of an ABM space system, the other side would have a right to regard itself free of the obligation to reduce strategic offensive arms.

The USSR delegation intends to continue pressing in Geneva for such solutions as would be fully in accord with the agreed-upon aim of the talks--prevention of an arms race in space, limitation and reduction of nuclear arms on Earth, consolidation of strategic stability, and, finally, full elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

(Pravda, May 9. In full.)

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CSO: 5200/1493

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

XINHUA CALLS INF 'POLITICAL CHIP' IN STRATEGIC STRUGGLE

OW040824 Beijing XINHUA in English 0758 GMT 4 May 87

["News Analysis: Key to U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Talks (by Ren Zhengde)"]--
XINHUA headline]

[Text] Geneva, May 4 (XINHUA)--The medium-range missiles in Europe have recently become the hot topic worldwide as a superpower treaty on such weapons seems close at hand.

But out of the glare, the U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic and space weapons are still locked in a stalemate although they will return to the negotiation table tomorrow after a month-long recess.

Over the past two months, the superpowers have each offered a draft accord on medium-range missiles. These missiles, with a range of 1,000 to 5,000 kilometers, have been dubbed intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) by American and Soviet negotiators.

They have agreed in principle to scrap 370 Soviet triple-warhead SS-20 and SS-4 missiles deployed in its European territory and 316 U.S. single-warhead Pershing-2 and cruise missiles based in Western Europe.

In somewhat similar proposals, each went even further by calling for "on-site inspection" and "strict verification" on the production, deployment and dismantling of INF weapons.

Moscow and Washington have shown unprecedented optimism about the prospects for an INF treaty and predicted a deal may be signed within the year.

However, both know clearly it will not be easy to work out their differences on specific details of verification, eliminating shorter-range missiles and where to put the 100 medium-range missiles each would be allowed to keep in the draft INF deals.

Above all, they have to ease Western Europe's fears about the Soviet threat after the removal of American INF missiles.

While the drama of an imminent missile deal captures most of the attention, the strategic and space weapons talks have much less promise. In fact, both sides have held back from offers made by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev at their meeting in Reykjavik last October.

The United States recently suggested extending the five-year deadline set at Reykjavik for scrapping half of each side's strategic arms to seven years. The Americans also now want to cut down the 10-year effectiveness period of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) to seven years.

The U.S. proposals are considered as an attempt to win time to strengthen its strategic nuclear forces and guarantee an earlier development and deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars" program.

At the same time, Washington's new proposals tried to place a lower ceiling on the number of Soviet land-based, long-range missiles. The U.S. believes the Soviets have an edge in this type of strategic weapon.

While denouncing the U.S. proposals for "moving backwards" and "endangering Soviet security," Moscow put forward its own. These were aimed at cutting additional U.S. sea- and air-launched missiles and keeping more of its own land-based nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union has so far made no concessions on Reagan's "Star Wars" program, the predominant and most controversial issue at their arms control talks in Geneva. It insists on limiting SDI to "laboratory research" and strongly opposes its deployment.

The INF talks were a "hot topic" when Gorbachev, in an unexpected and bold move, announced in February the "decoupling" of a pact on the INF and space weapons. Earlier, the Soviets insisted that both had to be part of any deal.

What is behind the hot topic?

The elimination of INF weapons will not harm superpower security. American and Soviet INF weapons in Europe account only for 3 percent of their total nuclear arsenals.

While the reduction or increase in strategic weapons, space arms in particular, has a direct effect on each side's quest for military nuclear superiority, the medium-range missiles are only the political chips in the U.S.-Soviet gambling over the "Star Wars" program.

A superpower INF treaty could help ease tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations and spur their talks on other nuclear weapons, which will be surely welcomed by world opinion.

Nevertheless, such a treaty, with its limited effect, will not stop the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race from extending to outer space. Nor will it change the general pattern of their relations.

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CSO: 5200/4002

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: U.S. DRAFT TREATY CONTRADICTS REYKJAVIK

Foreign Ministry Spokesman

AU121628 Paris AFP in English 1614 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Moscow, May 12 (AFP)--The Soviet Union said on Tuesday that Washington's new draft treaty on cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals represented a move away from the understanding reached at last year's Reykjavik summit.

Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said the plan for a 50 per cent reduction in the superpowers' nuclear arsenals, presented by U.S. negotiators in Geneva last week, contained "changes on several points" from the Reykjavik understanding last October between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Senior U.S. arms negotiator Ronald Lehman last week termed the draft treaty a "major step forward" in Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

Mr. Lehman said the draft granted a seven-year period for the treaty's application, rather than the five years as discussed when President Reagan met Mr Gorbachev in the Icelandic capital.

He explained that this was designed to give the Soviet Union "the flexibility they need to agree with the sub-limits."

But Mr. Gerasimov said on Tuesday: "The American plan does indeed reflect the understandings reached at Reykjavik. However not everything which we agreed on in Reykjavik has been included, and furthermore, we note changes (from Reykjavik) on several points."

The Soviet spokesman spelled out five "preliminary remarks on the U.S. proposal, noting that:

--the document did not take account of the link which objectively exists between reducing offensive strategic weapons and the elimination of the arms race in space, to be achieved through the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

--the U.S. proposal set a seven-year limit for the 50 per cent reduction in strategic weapons, instead of the five-year period agreed in Reykjavik.

--Washington's draft treaty envisaged "sub-ceilings" for strategic weapons, which Mr. Gerasimov said contradicted the agreement reached in Reykjavik and which "are designed to break down the Soviet strategic threesome (submarines, strategic rockets and bombers), which would jeopardise the security of the USSR."

--the plan did not mention limits on long-range naval-mounted cruise missiles.

--the U.S. proposal "leaves in suspense" the next moves by the two powers on limiting offensive strategic weapons.

Meanwhile in Rome, Soviet first deputy foreign minister Yuliy Vorontsov told a news conference he was surprised "at European opposition to the zero option: as if they had suddenly begun to like our SS-20's."

Broadcast to North America

LD161417 Moscow in English to North America 0100 GMT 16 May 87

["Top Priority" program, presented by Vladimir Pozner, with Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the United States of America and Canada Institute, Moscow]

[Text] How do you do ladies and gentlemen, this is Vladimir Pozner presenting "Top Priority". With me on the panel are doctors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of Moscow's United States and Canada Studies Institute. The subject today is one indeed of top priority, and it concerns the preliminary Soviet reaction to the American draft treaty on long-range nuclear weapons that was presented recently in Geneva. The spokesman for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Gerasimov, last Tuesday made a statement to the effect that in the preliminary, at least, assessment of the American offer there were five areas that the Soviet Union found difficult to accept. Let's put it that way. Here are the five points, and I would like us to examine them as we talk today: Number one, that the proposed American treaty departed from several of the agreements that were reached in Reykjavik, and that is in particular the understanding that an initial 50 percent cut in strategic weapons would be made in 5 years -- that was the Reykjavik agreement -- in the American document it is 7 years. Point number one. Point number two, that the American document sets subsidiary limits on specific classes of weapons which would force the Soviet Union to restructure its nuclear forces, a step that would be detrimental to Soviet security, said Mr Gerasimov. The third point, or the third objection, let's put it that way, is that Washington failed to include a cut in long range sea-launched cruise missiles in this draft treaty. Four: The absence in the document of provisions for further talks about the eventual elimination of all strategic offensive weapons. And fifth, last, but certainly not least in the objections is the lack of any link between cuts in strategic weapons and curbs on the development of space weapons. Dr Bogdanov.

[Bogdanov] I have a feeling it's the middle of the spring isn't it?

[Pozner] Yes it is.

[Bogdanov] And I'm sorry to say that I have a spring mood, and what does it mean to have a spring mood?

[Pozner] Means to be optimistic.

[Bogdanov] Means to be optimistic, you know. Let me say something which may sound optimistic. Number one, we have in Geneva just a series of talks; we have INF, we have shorter range, we have battlefield weapons. Now we have an American draft treaty on strategic with all the drawbacks, with all the things you have mentioned. It's a process which has already begun, that's what makes me optimistic. You know, you have INF and you have strategics. Now, I would like very much to look at all that, with all my criticism; really I share that view that it's not satisfactory for us, it's not even fair, and what as a professional I would rather worry on all five points you have mentioned. But one, but one is of especial worry to me, that we will have to restructure our strategic forces. And that's very old story Vladimir...you remember...

[Pozner] Way back.

[Bogdanov] Yeah, you have very, you have a (?false) symmetry. It's like an apple and like an orange. You cannot compare that. You have to find out some way [word indistinct] to build up a common ground.

But what is really optimistic is that the process has begun, and I believe that if you get an agreement on INF and if you have a framework statement of intentions, whatever you call it, which will be annexed, or that will be a leading document which will precede the INF agreement, then of course we can talk about summit meeting in a very serious term, as a meeting which will lead to the signing of those two documents. And I would appeal to my American colleagues at the other end to be more reasonable and let me be again optimistic and to think that the draft that they have laid down on the table in Geneva, it's not the last word of the American delegation.

[Pozner] Let me pick up on that. Dr Plekhanov, the American officials who put that draft on the table last week said, and I quote, that it was unlikely to win Soviet acceptance but that it was being presented to show Washington's willingness to press ahead with negotiations on strategic weapons despite the obstacles. In your opinion, as an expert in this field, do you think that indeed this draft does reflect an American desire to press ahead even though there are things that are not perhaps quite what the Soviet side would like?

[Plekhanov] Well, one has to be on the inside of the negotiations to give a definite answer to that, because the subject is too delicate, but, being on the outside it's too early to tell, because some of those positions in the draft are very old really. Old monkey wrenches.

[Pozner] Like which?

[Plekhanov] Well, like this provision to restructure which Dr Bogdanov referred to, or this failure to link the cuts in offensive weapons with...

[Pozner, interrupting] With curbs on space weapons?

[Plekhanov] Curbs on the research...

[Pozner, interrupting] The research, yes.

[Plekhanov] ...on space weapons. (?Second), the idea that no submarine-launched, rather sea-launched cruise missiles are to be included is another step back. And well, the fact that the United States is prepared to negotiate cuts in strategic weapons is in itself a good thing, but the problem is in the specific conditions that they are prepared to accept. If this is indeed not the last word then there is a possibility of a process that could lead to some framework or some agreement later on. But at this point I think it's too early to tell.

[Pozner] Excuse me. Do I take your tone as being somewhat less optimistic than the spring weather tone that Dr Bogdanov demonstrated?

[Plekhanov] Well, I don't know. That's for you to judge whether it sounds less optimistic.

[Pozner] Well to me it does. Now am I right? Correct me if I'm wrong.

[Plekhanov] Maybe I'm simply misinformed, I don't know, but to me I'm kind of, have a kind of a guarded judgement on what has been presented.

[Pozner] Dr Bogdanov?

[Bogdanov] You know, I am of the firm belief that the American side wants an agreement on strategic...

[Pozner] interrupting] Does want on agreement.

[Bogdanov] Does want an agreement.

[Pozner] Yes.

[Bogdanov] But the problem is what kind of agreement. You know our problem is that they always want some agreement from us at our expense, you know. But this is the time when we should meet half way, that we should accomodate each other. And after Reykjavik the position is absolutely clear. You have just to make some final, difficult, very difficult I admit, but some final touches. For instance Vladimir, we have explained to our American colleagues what we mean by laboratory research. We have made it absolutely clear what we mean by that, and it's much larger than to have it within just literally speaking laboratory walls. In a brief nutshell, you can research, but except into space. You can research it on the ground. You can test something on the ground, but except in the outer space. And if the American side is really willing to explore and really willing to find out common ground for a settlement, we're open. It's a chance. It's a real chance.

[Pozner] I'd like to throw you a curve, which is as you know an American baseball expression. In America, baseball begins in spring, and now that we've begun to play baseball in the Soviet Union I think it's fair to use that expression.

[Plekhanov] Yeah, Yeah.

[Pozner] The curve I want to throw you is as follows. Not too long ago one of the leading Soviet journalists, in a local newspaper, raised the issue of INF, and what he said was that while he felt that General Secretary Gorbachev's initiative of 28 February was a great thing, the idea of taking out all the medium-range missiles, he questioned the deployment of the SS-20's to begin with. He said why did we deploy them and was it not a mistake to deploy them way back when, and we have to work so hard to get them out along with the American missiles. Now the question I want to ask you is this: Might it not seem to be a mistake to tie cuts, major cuts, in strategic nuclear offensive weapons to curbs on the testing of space weapons? That is to say, might there not be argument that it is so important to cut strategic weapons what we should not couple the two, we should not link them. What would be your answer to that?

[Plekhanov] Well, I think that this linkage is of vital importance, because the offensive strategic weapons and the ABM systems which are now being discussed and research are organically linked with each other. The argument has been made by quite a few experts on the American side and in other countries that the SDI, if it can work, if it can possibly be constructed, can work only as an addition to an offensive potential, to an offensive strategic force which would be used for first-strike purposes. And then the SDI, an ABM system with space elements, would supposedly work as a defense against a crippled opponent, an opponent which which has so little wherewithal left that even a very leaky shield would be effective. So, the questions of offensive and defensive systems are linked in the very nature of things. They were linked back in 1972 when the SALT Treaty, SALT I Treaty and the ABM Treaty were signed, and I think there is a lot of wisdom in insisting on that linkage. Besides, you know there is a problem: If we simply give a green light to this research in space weapons will we not be opening a door to a radically new avenue of the arms race? The strategic offensive weapons are here with us. They are bad enough. There are too many of them, but they reflect an earlier stage in the arms race.

Now, by concentrating on just the offensive weapons and giving the go-ahead to the race in so-called defensive weapons wouldn't we be very shortsighted and oriented toward a short-term, quote success end quote? In the arms race, in the history of the arms race, there have been several decisions of this kind, when weapons which already exist and which are getting obsolete very fast have been easily banned while no restrictions were put on a new generation of weapons. That's what kept the old arms going and I think that we should put a stop to it.

[Pozner] Dr Bogdanov, how do you feel about all this?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I feel almost the same, but I would like to make one comment: Flexibility is also needed in that case too. Flexibility doesn't mean that you sacrifice your principles, you know, and I quite agree that you have a new conceptual problem, which is the link between offensive and defensive weapons. When they were deployed in Europe. [old history], that was quite different. You had to deal with the same category of weapons, maybe bigger, maybe smaller, three warheads, one warhead, but basically it's all the same. Now you have to quite differently think you know. You have a conceptual change which may bring you about a very drastic change in the whole strategic stability. That's what worries me. But at the same time of course it doesn't mean that you're so caught up that you have no flexible, you know, flexible, reasonable approach to that problem. Which by the way, we do demonstrate, we do...

[Pozner, interrupting] All right. Let me ask you as time begins to run out on us -- and I'd like a brief answer, if you can make it, like yes or no, I'd appreciate that -- if the Americans do not demonstrate any flexibility in as far as curbing anything at all in the space weapons programs, would you say that that means there will be no agreement on strategic offensive, on long-range strategic offensive weapons?

[Bogdanov] If I were on the decision-making level I would not come any agreement with the Americans if they don't curb space weapons.

[Pozner] What about you?

[PLekhanov] Neither would I.

[Pozner] All right. Now, my final question today: the sublimits in the American proposal that would force the Soviet Union to restructure its nuclear arsenal to be mirror-like vis-a-vis the American arsenal, which I think is virtually impossible in the sense of cost and in fact in the sense of commonsense. Here again, if the Americans insist on that particular point would you say that that would mean failure in reaching an agreement?

[Bogdanov] I'm afraid that the golden time for the Americans, when we were imitating them, has come to an end. That's my answer.

[Pozner] Right. Well, in that case, I think we can still be optimistic provided there is flexibility on both sides. Am I correct?

[Plekhanov] Yeah, of course.

[Bogdanov] Yes, sure.

[Pozner] However, we should also be realistic in assessing the proposals, the draft offered by the United States, and I think we've been quite realistic today. And on that note let me wish our listeners good listening, and invite them to join us a week from today at the same time for "Top Priority."

/8309

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S KARPOV ON 'KEY PROVISIONS' NEEDED FOR SUMMIT

PML81851 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 May 87 First Edition p 4

[V. Karpov article: "Geneva: Time to Decide"]

[Text] The proposal for a separate decision on medium-range missiles in Europe, formulated in M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February statement, cast new light on the state of affairs at the USSR-U.S. talks in Geneva. The main question has not been presented on a practical plane: Is there or is there not to be an agreement leading to the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, restricting them to a minimal level outside Europe, and thus making it possible to effect a real breakthrough in nuclear disarmament.

The USSR Draft

The latest round of the Geneva talks started 23 April with discussion of questions concerning medium-range missiles. Talks along the other avenues -- space and strategic offensive arms -- resumed 5 May.

On 27 April the USSR delegation submitted a compromise proposal for a draft treaty to eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and other measures to limit and reduce USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles. This document, further supplemented by draft-agreed statements and common understandings thereto, a memorandum on the setting of starting figures for medium-range missiles, and a protocol on procedures regulating the dismantling and destruction of medium-range missiles, encompassed everything positive that had emerged in the course of preceding discussions, this being in line with the Reykjavik accords.

The Soviet draft envisages that the elimination of USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe would be implemented in two stages over a 5-year period. Medium-range missiles and launch installations for medium-range missiles would be reduced by 50 percent during the first stage and would be completely eliminated during the second stage. Simultaneously with the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States would also implement measures to limit each side's medium-range missile warheads to 100 each in the Asian part of the USSR's territory and the U.S. national territory. The process of eliminating medium-range missiles would be started simultaneously by both sides and would be implemented under strict mutual verification.

The Soviet Union also proposed the elimination of USSR and U.S. operational and tactical missiles in Europe, and the solution of the question of such missiles outside Europe along lines similar to those applied to medium-range missiles, in other words by limiting them to minimum agreed levels.

The Soviet draft envisages an orderly system of guarantees that the accord reached will be strictly fulfilled. For this purpose, it is envisaged that the dismantling or destruction of medium-range missiles, launch installations for such missiles, and the corresponding auxiliary equipment will be effected in specially designated regions in accordance with agreed procedures. The sides would exchange schedules for the dismantling or destruction of means due to be reduced. The sides would pledge not to evade the provisions of the medium-range missiles treaty in any fashion, including the transmission to anyone else of medium-range missiles or components thereof, launch installations, or technical documentation referring to missiles or launch installations. Verification measures would cover both the exchange of data in the agreed amounts and observation [nablyudeniyey], including on-site observation, of the implementation of reductions and of the remaining medium-range missiles and related auxiliary installations and equipment, including on-site inspections whenever necessary. These inspections would be made both on the territory of the other side and within the territory of third countries where U.S. medium-range missiles and launch installations for such missiles are stationed. They would be carried out on the sites of dismantling or destruction of medium-range missiles and their launch installations, at test sites and military bases including those on the territory of third countries, and at warehouses, training centers, and manufacturing plants regardless of whether they are private or state-owned.

We are convinced that the Soviet draft provides a basis that would make it possible to elaborate a joint Soviet-U.S. draft and submit it for approval by the USSR and U.S. Government. [paragraph continues]

Nevertheless, it is still early to say that all the obstacles in the way of achieving this result have been eliminated. The U.S. stance still retains stipulations that constitute objective obstacles to reaching an accord, do not correspond to the task of reducing the level of nuclear confrontation, and are, rather, calculated toward retaining the U.S. missile presence in Europe under a different signboard.

Three Obstacles [subhead]

The nature of the discussions going on within NATO indicates that the Soviet initiative caught U.S. and other NATO figures unawares. A paradoxical picture has emerged. The very same statesmen and politicians who, until recently, were trying to convince the public they were in favor of a zero option regarding medium-range missiles in Europe and the Soviet Union -- or so it was claimed -- was blocking accord by presenting this problem as part of a package with other questions relating to nuclear arms and space are now feverishly seeking pretexts that could be used to at least delay reaching an accord.

Specifically we are talking, for example, of the U.S. desire to enshrine in the treaty its right to reequip the Pershing-2 missiles now in Europe and turn them into shorter-range missiles. In reality this means that, following a brief modification process already being developed at enterprises belonging to the U.S. Martin-Marietta company, the Pershing-2 missiles would lose their second stage while retaining their first stage and nuclear warhead, some electronic equipment at launch installations would be replaced, and thus the Pershing-2 would seemingly cease to exist. In actual fact, according to evidence from specialists, including U.S. specialists, the reverse operation would be equally simple to perform: The second stage is brought back, the electronic equipment boards are restored, and within approximately 48 hours, the Pershing-2 missile reemerges in combat condition. In this way, if such a procedure were to be allowed, the withdrawal of U.S. Pershing-2 missiles from Europe would be nothing but fiction. The United States is also reserving to itself the right to retain long-range cruise missiles in Europe, either dismounting their nuclear warheads or basing them on ships.

Another provision hindering an accord is on the procedure for carrying out the reduction. The United States is proposing the kind of procedure which at the first stage would reduce only the Soviet Union's medium-range missiles, while the United States merely monitored and inspected the USSR's actions. The United States' missiles and bases would remain off-limits to Soviet verification. It is clear that such an approach does not satisfy the principle of equality and identical security. Thus the Soviet proposals envisage the need for a simultaneous process of eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, and moreover done in such a way that a verification system would come into operation from the very beginning on both sides, so that the Soviet Union would have complete confidence that the destruction of medium-range missiles in Europe was being carried out in conformity with the accord reached.

The third element that causes objections is the U.S. reluctance to accept the principle proposed by the Soviet Union that the medium-range missiles remaining on USSR and U.S. national territories should be sited in such a way that their warheads cannot reach the other side's territory. This proposal is dictated by the fact that the siting of U.S. medium-range missiles within range of USSR territory, for example in Alaska, would essentially mean increasing the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union in conditions in which the latter would not increase the nuclear threat to the United States in any way and, furthermore, would even reduce its own nuclear armaments. The U.S. claims that it cannot agree to relinquish the right to site medium-range missiles in Alaska because the latter is part of U.S. national territory do not stand up to criticism. [paragraph continues].

After all, the Soviet Union also agrees to impose on its territory a certain limitation on the siting of its remaining medium-range missiles: first, not to site them west of the line of longitude 80 degrees east to ensure that they cannot reach Western Europe, and, second, to site them in such a way that they cannot reach U.S. territory in the easterly and northeasterly directions.

There are other unconstructive elements in Washington's stance.

The Situation Regarding Operational and Tactical Missiles [subhead]

At the same time the main attention has now focused on the discussions between the United States and its allies on the question of operational and tactical missiles, that is, missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km. The United States advocates not eliminating operational and tactical missiles in Europe but retaining this class of missiles. In addition to everything else, it is also clearly seeking an extra loophole to avoid the really radical solution of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe. If operational and tactical missiles are retained, it argues, it is clearly possible to insist on the possibility of refitting Pershing-2s as operational and tactical missiles. It sounds paradoxical, but the USSR proposes eliminating its operational and tactical missiles in Europe virtually unilaterally, whereas the United States is trying to persuade the Soviet Union not to do this and to grant the U.S. side the right to have missiles of this class in Europe. It would seem that considerations relating to the plans being developed within NATO for creating a European ABM system are by no means of least importance here. The United States is harboring these plans as a means of involving the European NATO members in the U.S. SDI program. Since those countries are not party to the ABM Treaty, the United States is thereby given the opportunity to circumvent its commitments under the ABM Treaty.

The NATO consultations are proving protracted, as is discussion of the question of medium-range missiles at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. The U.S. side cites the need to work out a common position for the NATO countries because, it claims, in this case their interests and security are directly concerned. This approach can be understood in principle. However, we are put on our guard by the reports from NATO headquarters that it is the retention of operational and tactical missiles in Europe that is seemingly at the center of the discussions under way. The United States, clearly recognizing the weakness of its argument in favor of retaining operational and tactical missiles in Europe, has not "agreed" to the destruction by the Soviet Union of the increased-range operational and tactical missiles that were once sited in the GDR and Czechoslovakia as a retaliatory measure at the start of the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe. But the United States continues to insist on having some quantity of these missiles in Europe. Judging by press reports, various options are being discussed and various amount cited. It is proposed, for instance, to allow the United States and the Soviet Union to have 80 operational and tactical missiles each.

The European participants in NATO have found themselves in a strange position. In 1979, when NATO adopted the so-called "two-track decision," all the bloc countries were agreed that U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe would be eliminated if the Soviet Union agreed to scrap its SS-20 missiles. There was no question then of operational and tactical missiles. But now the United States is talking about the possibility of siting not only operational and tactical missiles in Europe, but missiles with a range of less than 500 km. There have been reports that the United States is planning to modernize its Lance missiles with a view to giving them a range of 300-400 km and deploying them in European positions.

As for the European states, for them the time has come for a serious and considered decision. Europe is experiencing what has rightly been called a moment of truth. It is now that West Europe must decide whether it will go down the road of real disarmament, starting with the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles, or whether it will continue to be held prisoner to the obsolete doctrines of nuclear deterrence.

Security Is Possible [subhead]

The Soviet Union does not propose simply "abolishing" nuclear weapons in Europe. It does not propose returning to the situation that prevailed in Europe 50 years ago, fraught with the threat of war. The USSR proposes, while eliminating nuclear weapons, to create a comprehensive European security system which would rule out the possibility of war even with the use of conventional arms. The Soviet proposals envisage consistent reductions in troops and arms in Europe to levels that would be sufficient merely for defense and repelling aggression, and would not allow European states -- including the two opposing blocs -- to conduct any kind of offensive operation.

Although the medium-range missile problem is currently at the center of world public attention, we must not lose sight of other problems relating to nuclear and space arms. The Soviet Union proposed at the Geneva talks to work out the "key provisions of agreements" envisaging the achievement of a basic accord with regard to strengthening the provisions [rezhim] of the ABM Treaty (in order to rule out the spread of the arms race to space), ensuring 50-percent cuts in Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive arms, and starting talks on phased reductions in nuclear tests. As Secretary of State G. Shultz was informed, the Soviet side believes that these aspects of the problem of nuclear and space arms are as substantial in their importance as the question of medium-range missiles. We will not make an agreement on medium-range missiles

contingent on a decision on space and strategic offensive arms. But the U.S. side knows that if it were possible to agree on "key provisions" while a joint draft of a medium-range missile treaty were worked out, that could form a real basis for a subsequent Soviet-U.S. summit.

Main Flaw [subhead]

How did the U.S. side respond? The U.S. delegation submitted a draft strategic offensive weapons (SOW) treaty to the talks 8 May. The draft contains the basic provisions agreed upon in Reykjavik -- namely, the reduction of Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive weapons to 1,600 ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers, with up to 6,000 nuclear charges. At the same time the submitted draft contains no restrictions on long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. The U.S. draft again returns to the pre-Reykjavik period with regard to the various sublevels on the arms the USSR and the United States would retain after the reductions. The draft contains a whole series of other provisions that seriously complicate the possibility of reaching an agreement on 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive weapons. For instance, they have again dragged up the proposal to include a medium bomber (the "Backfire") with Soviet strategic arms, even though the USSR and the United States officially registered the common understanding back in 1979 that it was not a strategic bomber.

But the main flaw in the U.S. draft is that it wholly ignores the dependence of strategic offensive weapons reductions on an agreement preventing an arms race in space. Unless the ABM Treaty is wholly retained for a sufficiently long period -- a minimum of 10 years -- it will be impossible to implement deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons. This truth is well known to the U.S. side. It was at the core of the discussions held in Reykjavik. However, what the United States is proposing in this sphere at Geneva means moving even more sharply away from Reykjavik than on other issues. [paragraph continues]

The United States is now no longer prepared to agree with the Soviet Union not to exercise its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years. It is proposing a solution that has nothing to do with Reykjavik -- namely, that the Soviet Union must essentially sign an agreement which means that after 1994 the United States can embark on the full implementation of its "Star Wars" program and, prior to that date, can conduct any work in the field for 7 years, refraining merely from deploying an ABM system in space.

Obviously, this approach cannot serve even as a basis for a serious discussion. Moreover, it provides no lead into a mutually acceptable agreement. Embarking on such a decision means embarking on the destruction of the open-ended ABM Treaty, which is the foundation of the entire strategic offensive weapons limitation and reduction process. If that foundation is destroyed, the prospects for strategic offensive weapons reductions will be destroyed with it.

We would not like to think that the United States wants to give up on the possibility of reaching agreement with the USSR on the central issue of strategic offensive weapons reductions. At the same time, we cannot ignore the serious obstacles that the United States is creating through its position at the talks.

Not Wasting A Unique Chance [subhead]

Our course of reaching agreement over the entire range of nuclear and space arms remains in force. The Soviet proposals provide the necessary conditions for working out mutually acceptable solutions. If the United States is really interested in reducing the level of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union, and if it is prepared in deeds rather than words to move down the road of strategic offensive weapons reductions and solve the problem of medium-range missiles, it could achieve this in cooperation with the USSR. But to this end the United States must eschew the course of the arms race and of trying to secure unilateral advantages.

A unique opportunity has now been created in Soviet-U.S. relations -- primarily through the efforts of the Soviet Union -- to break the dangerous trend toward arms races in more and more types of nuclear weapons and prevent an arms race in space. But to achieve this we must realize that the moment of truth now upon us requires bold, unorthodox solutions and political courage.

/8309

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S VORONTSOV ON WESTERN REACTION TO ARMS PROPOSALS

PM151102 Paris LE FIGARO in French 13 May 87 p 2

[Article by First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov: "Turning Wishful Thinking Into Action..."]

[Text] The latest Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals are particularly consistent with the wishes expressed by Western Europe, notably France. We are very close to finding a solution. Frankly, it is difficult for us to understand the logic and arguments of those who are now expressing their anxiety and, more especially, those who are abandoning their own objectives at the very time when there is a real possibility of attaining them -- those who are abandoning the "zero option" and progress "toward a balance of forces at the lowest possible level." They are thus departing from their own previous proposals, obstinately seeing a "trap" for the West in the simple fact that we are taking account of the Western countries' worries and demands. To say that the withdrawal of Soviet medium-range missiles and shorter-range tactical missiles would place Western Europe in a less favorable position than in 1979 (before the deployment of the U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles) seems rather unconvincing, not to say paradoxical. The balance of forces essentially has not changed.

At the same time, even if these missiles were reduced to zero, Europe would still have a large number of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, amounting to almost 4,500 nuclear warheads. The U.S. forward-based weapons are still not included in any agreement. These weapons amount to more than 400 F-111, F-4, and F-16 fighter-bombers capable of striking all the territory of the European socialist countries and the European part of the USSR. In addition to these, there are the aircraft on carriers.

In addition, and this is the most important thing, the French and British nuclear capabilities are not involved and are still being modernized and actively developed. All these facts and the presence of more than 300,000 U.S. soldiers in Western Europe are for some reason not taken into account by those who fear a "break in the link" between U.S. and West European security. The "link" was not first established 4 years ago when the U.S. medium-range missiles were deployed in Western Europe, however. The dismantling of the medium-range and reduced-range missiles will not destroy U.S. political, economic, and military interests in Europe.

We are not avoiding tackling the problem of the remaining tactical nuclear weapons either. While taking account of their "dual purpose," and their link with the general organization of the armed forces, we are proposing to settle this question in a comprehensive way by reducing the armed forces and conventional weapons, including tactical planes in which the West has clear superiority, and we have proposed practical measures in this sphere.

As in the past, people are harping on monitoring problems like an old scratched disc, as if there were no Stockholm agreement on confidence-building measures and no statements by the USSR reaffirming its desire -- in its own interest and that of others -- to have agreements. If we are talking about the reduction and, more especially, the elimination of whole classes of nuclear weapons in Europe, we are at least as anxious as other people (if not more, because the Soviet Union is making the greatest reductions) to ensure that the agreements will be stringently implemented.

In our view, all missiles and launch installations without exception, including components in factories and enterprises, must be strictly monitored, including on-site inspections, irrespective of whether the owner is the state or a private individual. The inspectors must have access to any area where their presence is required.

It is difficult to accept that potential agreements might be hampered by any kind of reservations that postpone their signing and water down their content and significance, especially since these restrictive clauses are often based on misconceptions. Let us take the example of conventional weapons. Many people in the West regard Soviet "superiority" in this area as self-evident. But this is a mistaken view. The London International Institute for Strategic Studies stated in a recent report that the balance of conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe is still such that a general military aggression would be an extremely dangerous enterprise for either side...that it is evident that neither side has an overwhelming superiority of forces that would guarantee it victory. There is, of course, an asymmetry of armed forces in Europe as a result of historical, geographical, and other factors. If disapproval is going to be expressed about one side's partial superiority in a particular sphere, we can juggle with figures indefinitely. We are proposing to eliminate these elements of inequality in a radical way.

The USSR resolutely advocates the rapid drafting of an international convention on the banning and destruction of chemical weapons, and has stopped producing them. With this chemical disarmament in mind, we have started constructing a special enterprise to destroy existing chemical weapons. [paragraph continues]

To be frank, at a time when the drafting of an ad hoc convention is entering its final phase, it is difficult to find a rational explanation for France's decision to consider starting production of chemical weapons, in view of the fact that France has always opposed this type of weapon and was even a depositary of the 1925 Geneva protocol banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The search for greater security cannot continue to be pursued by a constant accumulation of new types of weapons. Given that there are tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, and that the numbers are rapidly increasing, nuclear weapons have ceased to be a deterrent and have become a vast threat hanging over mankind. This first step toward disarmament -- probably the most difficult one because it is the first -- is extremely important. If it is taken, many questions that now seem tricky, some based on norms and concepts inherited from the early fifties, may be seen in an entirely different light. The essential thing now is to clearly see the facts and show sufficient political will. We are on the point of finally turning wishful thinking about disarmament into practical action.

/8309

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TURKISH PAPER INTERVIEWS SOVIET AIDE

NC111035 Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 3 May 87 p 12

["Exclusive" interview with Yuriy Gremitskikh, deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Department, in Moscow by HURRIYET correspondent Ertugrul Ozkok--date not given]

[Text] [Ozkok] Although the Soviet Union has recently launched a "proposal attack" on the question of nuclear arms, the crisis of confidence between the Eastern and Western blocs has not been fully overcome. How sincere is the Soviet Union in this regard?

[Gremitskikh] I don't know how correct it is to use the word "attack" in this connection. The proposals in question are related to "peace" and not to "war." Nevertheless, we would agree to the term "peace offensive." The essence of the whole affair is that the Soviet Union is seizing every opportunity on matters related to disarmament. Since the Soviet Union and Turkey are neighbors, I would like to explain the Soviet view in clear terms. The Soviet Union and its allies have raised every subject related to all aspects of disarmament during the past few years. They have put forward proposals concerning strategic medium-range missiles, shorter-range missiles, and conventional and chemical weapons.

We have put forward proposals to the United States and NATO regarding the complete removal of nuclear arms. We suggested that a minimum number--that is to say, 100 warheads--be retained in Asia and the United States. We did not link our proposals to the Strategic Defense Initiative. In other words, we excluded this question from the package.

Recently, we launched another initiative. We agreed to include operational tactical missiles which have an increased range of between 500 and 1,000 km in the accord. Furthermore, taking into consideration the situation related to the question of conventional arms, we agreed that the missiles which have a range of less than 500 km be reduced in number and destroyed in accordance with the agreement to be reached between the two blocs.

In short, with the proposals it has put forward, the Soviet Union has agreed to all the proposals the West has made thus far. We agreed to the zero option on the medium-range missiles, which the West considered as an illusion. We also agreed to either reduce or completely remove the other type of missiles. Now, the West has arrived at a point where it has to decide. It has to prove whether the proposals it made in the past were sincere.

We have observed that the United States and Europe differ in their approach toward many aspects of the question of disarmament because of their geographical positions. It is a fact that what the Americans think about European security at the strategic level is different from the way they regard their own safety. In view of the opportunity we now have to reach an agreement, the responsibility of the United States and its allies in Western Europe is far greater at the present time than it was in the past. The European countries will have to decide whether they should support U.S. policy or insist on the conclusion of a historic agreement for the sake of their own security and that of the Western world.

We may not reach agreement quickly. There will be elections in the United States next year. This means that we will lose a year between now and the elections. We will lose another year after the new U.S. Administration takes office. All that time will have been lost. In the meantime, the arms will continue to be modernized.

[Ozkok] Insofar as Turkey and its allies are concerned, Soviet strength in conventional weapons is one of the main factors contributing to the confidence crisis. You have got a very strong army and tank units in the Caucasus region. Nuclear arms have set up a kind of balance. If we were to remove this balance, wouldn't the imbalance between the conventional forces of the two sides lead to war instead of enhancing peace?

[Gremitskikh] Let us first discuss the so-called Soviet superiority in conventional arms. The overall population of the NATO countries is 1.8 percent greater than that of the Warsaw Pact members. Furthermore, NATO's industrial potential is double that of the Warsaw Pact countries. The overall number of NATO's Armed Forces is higher than the Warsaw Pact equivalent.

On the question of moving troops and weapons at times of war, the distance involved for Soviet units and arms to reach Europe from Siberia or from the Far East is equal to the distance that U.S. troops will need to travel to reach Western Europe. However, let me point out that this is measured in terms of hours rather than kilometers.

Regardless of all this, the Soviet proposals on conventional arms have never before been so flexible. We are ready to conclude agreements on all types of conventional arms and reach accords on establishing balances which will inspire confidence in everyone.

[Ozkok] You said that the medium-range missiles that will be removed from Western Europe will be installed in Asia. Part of Turkey is in Asia too. Whereabouts in Asia will the missiles be installed? Will Turkey still be within their range?

[Gremitskikh] This has recently been explained by the highest officials. We have proposed the following: The missiles will be completely removed from Europe. The United States and the Soviet Union will retain 100 missiles. Those that the Soviet Union will keep will be installed at sites from where they will not pose a threat to NATO countries. Likewise, the missiles that will be based in the United States will be installed at sites from which they will not be able to reach the Soviet Union.

If an agreement is reached on dismantling medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union will be prepared to agree to dismantle operational tactical missiles, which were installed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia in the past in response to the Pershing II and Cruise missiles. This would be subject to an agreement with the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The reason for maintaining 100 medium-range missiles in Asia is as follows: The United States has medium-range missiles directed against the Soviet Union at its bases in Japan and South Korea.

[Ozkok] That is to say, Turkey will not be within the range of the Soviet medium-range missiles that will be installed in Asia.

[Gremitskikh] One provision of the agreement would be that none of the 100 medium-range missiles will be able to reach NATO countries.

[Ozkok] Can we take your statement as meaning that Turkey will not be within range of the missiles referred to?

[Gremitskikh] Yes, since Turkey is a NATO country.

[Ozkok] No, we mentioned Turkey twice but you have only talked about the "NATO countries." We want to hear you say the name of Turkey.

[Gremitskikh] Of course, Turkey will remain out of range of the missiles.

[Ozkok] If the two sides reach agreement to reduce their conventional forces, will the conventional forces in the Caucasus be reduced as well?

[Gremitskikh] Let the talks start first. Each side will bring its problems to the negotiating table. Our view is that extraordinary defense measures should not be put into effect unless they are necessary.

[Ozkok] The Soviet Union and Syria recently held high-level talks. Was any suggestion made to Syria concerning the establishment of an independent Palestinian state?

[Gremitskikh] The discussions between the two countries have been reported by the Soviet press. The Soviet and Syrian positions have been clearly defined. The Soviet Union has always supported the just cause of the Arab peoples. It has also supported the right of the Palestinian people to establish their own state. Any change in the Soviet stand is out of the question.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1496

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: WESTERN POLITICIANS DO NOT 'DARE' TO AGREE

PM111601 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 May 87 First Edition p 3

[[Yu. Soldatenko "International Observations": "Why Are They 'Passing the Buck' in the West?"]]

[Text] The set of new far-reaching initiatives for the elimination of several classes of nuclear weapons in Europe proposed by the Soviet Union was yet another convincing confirmation of the USSR's adherence to the cause of peace. In proposing to completely destroy medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles simultaneously, the USSR has conveyed its readiness to examine and resolve the question of tactical nuclear means.

However, such a resolute and wide-ranging approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament evokes, to use the NEW YORK TIMES' expression, a decidedly "unpleasant feeling among Pentagon figures." And not only among them. The WESTFAELISCHE RUNDSCHAU, commenting on the Western reaction to the new Soviet peace initiatives, writes, for example, that the way it looks now is that the leaders of Western countries are afraid of their own previous disarmament proposals. The more wide-ranging the Soviet Union's peace initiatives become, the more deeply these Western policies take refuge in "concealment."

Why does this happen? Why are there increasingly distinct signs in the actions of Western political circles of that already familiar game of "passing the buck" backward and forward? Thus, European leaders maintain that the question of a future agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles concerns only the Americans and the Russians. And the Americans plead that they are really not against an agreement on the elimination of their nuclear missiles in Europe but that their allies, you see, are hesitant. And without their agreement the United States supposedly does not have the right to make any move, because it has "Atlantic commitments" to Western Europe.

The cause of this "vicious circle," which certain forces in the West find it extremely convenient to employ to delay the attainment of agreements on the elimination of nuclear missiles in Europe, which is very important for international detente, is quite simple. It lies in the fact that the opponents of a reduction in military tension today cannot reject the Soviet Union's peace

proposals "out of hand," as they have in the past. Because by doing that they risk turning public opinion in their own countries against the NATO line of "arms-upgrading."

The USSR's initiatives have put U.S. and Western European leaders advocating conservative views in a very difficult position. And they simply do not know how they must act in order to "force the Russians" to definitely renounce the ideas of nuclear disarmament.

It can even be said that Western politicians are in something of a state of shock. Not so long ago they were managing to mislead public opinion in the NATO bloc countries, justifying their rejection of Soviet initiatives, for example, by reference to the supposed "key significance of verifying the observance of accords." They said that the Soviet Union would not agree to the "rigid" American verification means only because it was constantly violating the terms of the arms limitation agreements. There were a considerable number of these inventions, and they "worked," as it were.

However, now the situation has sharply changed. The Soviet Union is not only agreeing to any forms or methods of monitoring nuclear arms reduction agreements but is also insisting that all missiles and launch installations remaining after the reduction be subject to verification, including verification by on-site inspection. Moreover this applies to nuclear arms both in combat array and at all other sites [obyektakh]: test ranges, manufacturing plants, training centers, and so on. Inspectors must also be given access to the other side's military bases on the territory of third country. This is essential in order to obtain complete confidence that an agreement is being strictly observed.

Such verification is logical and reliable. But such verification, to all appearances, does not suit the conservative forces of the West, although that is precisely what they were fighting for earlier. What, in their opinion, would it actually mean in practice? Penetration by the "Russians" with their "communist ideas" into the holy of holies of Western society. Arms manufacturers and their political proteges in the higher echelons of government are no longer alarmed that Soviet inspector-verifiers would "steal secrets" of advanced technology from the military-industrial complex (these are propaganda tales for simpletons). They are simply horrified at the thought that in agreeing to verification of nuclear weapons and to "rigid" forms of monitoring, the West will be obliged at the same time to renounce the principle of the inviolability of private property which is "vitally important" to the whole system of capitalism. But this is already not a question of military technology of diplomacy, but exclusively a question of class. And its solution is demonstrating more than convincingly who is really bringing the process of nuclear disarmament to a standstill, and why.

Unable to make up their minds or, more precisely, not daring to "offend" the powers that be, the political leaders of the NATO countries are also resorting to the "game" of "buck passing." Let someone else, and not me, be the first to agree to nuclear disarmament and strict control of the process, they say. Let someone else and not me be labeled a "Red," these "people's elected representatives" reason.

It is easy to understand that such a game in Western political circles accords only with the mercenary interests of arms manufacturers and not with the peoples' innermost aspirations. And this is where its great danger lies. Delaying the resolution of the question of eliminating a whole type of nuclear armaments is not only out of keeping with the spirit of the age but also increases the nuclear threat to all mankind.

/8309

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: NATO LEADERS 'ALWAYS OPPOSED' TO ZERO OPTION

PM191427 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 87 First Edition p 3

[International observer Manki Ponomarev article under the rubric "International Observer Answers Reader": "They Were Always Opposed"]

[Text] "There is one thing I do not understand about one question," Senior Lieutenant P. Korablev asks the editorial office. "Insofar as I remember, the 'zero option' on the so-called 'Euromissiles' was once put forward by the United States, and for a number of years the leaders of the NATO countries advocated it strongly. But now the Soviet Union is proposing to eliminate all medium-range missiles in Europe -- both Soviet and U.S. missiles -- and the West, judging by the press, is opposed to it. How can that be?"

The letter from reader Senior Lt. P. Korablev is answered by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA international observer Manki Ponomarev.

Yes indeed, Comrade Korablev, it was the United States which first put forward the proposal to agree to the "zero option" on medium-range missiles in Europe. It once raised a grand commotion over the proposal, bringing in its allies to support its campaign. The essence of the option boiled down to Washington's assurances that if the USSR scrapped its missiles -- which are called SS-20's and SS-4's in the West -- the NATO "arms upgrading" decision, that is, the decision to site U.S. Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles on the territories of a number of West European countries, would not go ahead. They claimed that zero Soviet missiles would be matched by zero U.S. missiles.

At the time the Soviet Union raised extremely serious objections to the U.S. proposal. Since then many things have changed. But the hypocritical essence of the proponents of "arms upgrading" was revealed immediately after the Soviet Union proposed eliminating all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe over the next 5 years. Would that mean "zero" again, you might ask? Yes, zero. Only on a new basis -- on the basis of the Soviet program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons by the start of the 21st century. On the basis of an understanding that global security and mankind's survival must be safeguarded by joint efforts on the part of various countries and peoples -- by political means, not weapons. On the basis of the clear prospects for a nonnuclear world that opened up in Reykjavik, where it was shown that nuclear disarmament is an entirely realistic policy.

The Soviet version of the zero option, which was set out in M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February 1987 statement and supplemented and developed in a number of his subsequent speeches, produced a truly enormous impression on world public opinion. The widespread

approval and support for it are quite well known. It is important to stress something else: The Soviet initiative came as a real shock to the enemies of peace and security and all those who are still held prisoner to strongarm nuclear thinking.

"The Russians are coming, not with weapons and soldiers but with more and more disarmament proposals -- only that is not enough for the NATO military men and politicians," as the West German magazine STERN sarcastically assessed the prevailing situation. Yes, for how many years have the peoples of Europe and other continents been scared of the "Soviet threat." We have always said that this is a myth whipped up for malicious purposes; we do not intend to attack anyone, that is alien to our aspirations and our ideology. They did not believe us -- or pretended they did not -- and continued to scare others by shouting "the Russians are coming!..."

Those who have always striven not to weaken but to intensify nuclear confrontation in Europe and other parts of the world, never giving a thought to a genuine zero option, have been trying to go down the same primitive path -- seeking nonexistent obstacles. Yes, people in the West started to shout, we agree to zero medium-range missiles, but the Russians have an advantage in operational and tactical missiles. So, the Soviet Union replied, let's agree to eliminate that type of missile too. Let those be zero too -- a double zero option. But, we were asked, what about tactical nuclear means, battlefield missiles? We will embark on talks on this problem too, and we will solve it. But won't that leave the Warsaw Pact with an advantage in conventional means? Well, first, the Warsaw Pact Organization has no such superiority over the NATO bloc, and that is quite well known; and second, the Warsaw Pact countries have long been proposing to reduce armed forces and conventional arms on the European continent from the Atlantic to the Urals, but for some reason have never received a constructive and businesslike response to their initiative.

So what is going on? In the search for an answer let us turn to another West German magazine, this time DER SPIEGEL. "The Russians," a recent issue stated, "have put forward proposals that meet the Western allies' (sham) demands." It is that little word "sham," which the magazine emphatically brackets, that is the key to understanding the position of those who are opposed: They stand not for agreement, but for preventing any agreement at all.

Incidentally, those who are opposed to agreement are not particularly sophisticated in their philosophizing. Take General B. Rogers, commander in chief of the NATO Allied Armed Forces: "Abandoning nuclear weapons will leave Europe defenseless." Take R. Ridgway, U.S. assistant secretary of state: "It is not a question of a nonnuclear Europe or of a NATO without nuclear weapons." Take L. Ruehl, state secretary at the FRG Defense Ministry: "There can be no question of the so-called zero option at the talks on medium-range nuclear weapons." The French newspaper LE MONDE went so far as to state that a possible agreement on medium-range missiles would be a..."new Munich" for Europe.

Those who hold such views can quite rightly be called representatives of "dead-end thinking." There are others too. They allegedly favor agreement. But they hedge it round with conditions and provisos aimed at preventing agreement. This relates to the proposals not to scrap the Pershing-2's but to reduce their range by removing one stage (incidentally, according to the manufacturer's figures, the second stage and accompanying guidance electronics could be refitted in just 48 hours); to transfer B-52 strategic bombers to Europe and to fit them (or ships off the coast of the continent) with cruise missiles; to introduce 300 units of neutron weapons into the FRG, and so on and so forth.

Those are the actions of people who are in no way either able or willing to eschew old thinking, strong-arm policies, and nuclear deterrence. There are other opponents of the zero option too, particularly in the capitals of certain NATO countries. They express fears that if the United States scrapped its medium- and shorter-range nuclear means in West Europe in agreement with the USSR, West Europe would allegedly be left defenseless in the face of the Soviets, since Washington would not use its own strategic means to defend it and would not want to place U.S. territory under the threat of a retaliatory strike.

Fears of this kind are very, very artificial. Not just because the Soviet Union does not intend to attack anyone: The United States by no means keeps its forces -- including its nuclear forces -- in Europe out of altruism, but for far-reaching purposes. It has seen and intends to continuing seeing the West European countries' territories as a springboard for attacking the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, and its troops are there as one of the most important tools in its strong-arm, imperial policy. That is why it does not intend to withdraw them.

Washington clings to "Atlantic solidarity" and strives to prevent any weakening of the NATO bloc. So it depicts its troops on the European Continent as guarantees of and hostages to this "solidarity." Pentagon chief C. Weinberger once said in a moment of frankness: "We keep our troops in Europe because it is in our own interests" -- the interests of the military-industrial complex and monopoly capital in both the United States itself and other NATO countries.

It is these interests that are expressed by those who have always been and continue to be opponents of the zero option -- an option that could and should be a landmark on the way to a nuclear-free Europe, and then to a nuclear-free world.

In conclusion then, Comrade Korablev, I would like to quote from M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February statement: "The Soviet leadership and the country's Defense Council, whose leadership is entrusted to me," he said, "constantly have the problem of the security of our country and our allies, and universal security at the center of their attention." And you, as an officer in the Soviet Armed Forces, know for yourself just how weighty those words are.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1496

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: WESTERN DIFFERENCES OVER ZERO OPTION VIEWED

LD171040 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0250 GMT 17 May 87

[Political observer Nikolay Shishlin commentary]

[Text] International discussions are focussing on the problems of breaking through to realistic, practical steps to curtail the arms race and, in particular on the problems of eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. We are now discovering that the difference in the Western countries' stances is extremely great, not only among the countries as such but also within these countries.

Let us take the United States. It is as if the White House and the U.S. secretary of state advocate with a greater or lesser degree of certainty the double-zero option, that is, zero for medium-range missiles and zero for operational and tactical missiles. But if you take U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger, then the latter is saying that he advocated zero for medium-range missiles but that he by no means favors a zero for operational and tactical missiles. There are people who are even further to the right of Weinberger. Or, take for example the recent visit to the United States by West German Vice Chancellor Genscher. There Genscher quite definitely advocated the double-zero option both for medium-range and for operational and tactical missiles. At the same time, if you take FRG Chancellor Kohl, then he definitely advocates zero only for medium-range missiles.

So far as France's position is concerned, well, I think that the listeners know very well that its stance was revealed during the visit by French Prime Minister Chirac. Basically, the French consider that without nuclear weapons European security would be vulnerable. This position is, of course, groundless, unproven, illogical, but nevertheless that is the position.

It is as if the coming 6 weeks comprising June and the remaining days of May will determine the speed of movement toward a possible solution of this problem. At that time it will be possible to reply with greater certainty to the question of whether it will prove possible to reach in 1987 an accord on medium-range missiles in Europe and thus break through to new horizons as a whole in the approach to disarmament problems.

After all, a solution on medium-range missiles would be valuable as the first example of specific practical steps on disarmament and as a very strong stimulus for further solutions in this whole particular and vital area, without whose resolution it is impossible to establish trust and impossible to ensure a radical improvement in the world situation.

So, one way or another, in the middle of 1987 we are able to say that the opportunities for achieving an agreement are increasing. It would, of course, be extremely sad if these opportunities of the year were missed.

/8309

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW 'INTERNATIONAL SITUATION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS'

LD152354 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 15 May 87

["International Situation--Questions and Answers" program presented by Konstantin Patsyuk, with Viktor Filatov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent; Rodomir Bogdanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute; "colleague" Sergey Pravdin; and Kazbek Basiyev, Middle East correspondent]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[Patsyuk] The new Soviet peace initiative is a subject that is mentioned in all of our listeners' letters. Matters of disarmament, especially the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe, interest Comrade Shilov from the village of Kondrashkino, Kashirskiy rayon, Voronezh Oblast; Vasiliy Petrovich Portnov from Chkalovskiy, Tajik SSR; and many others. They would like to know what problems are involved in eliminating these missiles, and how realistic it is to achieve an agreement. Of course, they also would like to know where things stand today at the Geneva talks; that is, where the problem is under discussion. I'll ask Professor Radomir Georgeyevich Bogdanov, doctor of historical sciences, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute, to answer these questions. Please.

[Bogdanov] History has decreed that Geneva should be the location for many remarkable events, and, it must be said, mainly events of a positive sort. Many peace initiatives, upon which people's fates depended to a considerable extent, have been given birth and developed in Geneva. It would probably be no exaggeration to say that the previous talks that have taken place in this city have never been of such decisive importance for the fate of all mankind. First of all, they are taking place during the missiles age -- the space age -- a period when our planet is literally groaning under the weight of the stockpiled weapons, when an absolutely new and deadly threat is being drawn up to transform space into an arena for fighting and a new source of danger for our planet.

I would like to remind our listeners of some factual data concerning medium-range missiles. The United States now has 380 of these missiles in Western Europe, of which 108 are Pershings, rather Pershing-2's, and 272 cruise missiles. The Soviet Union has 355 missiles in its European component -- 243 missiles known as the SS-20's and 112 SS-4's. As you know, the deployment of such missiles has ceased in the Soviet Union.

In addition, there are Soviet operational and tactical missiles in Europe; that is, missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km and tactical nuclear weapons with a range of 500 km or less. It is important to draw our listeners' attention to the fact that the moaning now heard in the West about the alleged unilateral disarmament of the West resulting from the Soviet initiatives is devoid of any truth.

Some additional information: Apart from the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, the United States has 640 carrier aircraft near the European Continent. These aircraft are capable of making a deep strike into the territory of the European socialist countries and a considerable part of the European USSR.

In addition, the 6th and 2d operational fleets of the U.S. Navy are in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic. Approximately 300 carrier-based attack aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons are based on their aircraft carriers.

Finally, sea-based cruise missiles with a range of up to 2,600 km continue to be supplied to these fleets. Of course, if these are to be entered into the calculations, the Armed Forces of the NATO member states have no less than 7,000 nuclear warheads in the West European zone.

[Patsyuk] What is now happening in Geneva? More details, please, Radomir Georijevich.

[Bogdanov] The USSR delegation had been given instructions on 23 April to immediately embark upon elaborating specific accords on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles with the U.S. delegation. The Soviet draft treaty on medium-range missiles is on the table. This draft is not an end in itself: an agreement on medium-range missiles, in our view, would also secure progress in other aspects of the talks, and, objectively, all the necessary conditions are there for this. These conditions have been created by the important accords achieved by the U.S. and Soviet leaders in Reykjavik, and also by the recent Soviet initiatives in all areas under review at the Geneva talks.

I would like to remind our listeners that in a conversation with Secretary of State Shultz, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed his readiness to include in an agreement on medium-range missiles a pledge by the Soviet Union to simultaneously eliminate its operational and tactical missiles in Europe, and to hold talks on those missiles deployed in the eastern part of our country and on U.S. territory. A majority of statesmen and politicians and the general public has constructively received the Soviet proposals on disarmament.

There is, however, a paradox: Those people who were most given to bemoaning the danger of nuclear weapons are now also demonstrating alarm. Much conjecture is being tossed about to frighten people and new fears are being whipped up. It is vexing that once again they are confusing themselves and the public with suspicions that they claim Moscow has conjured up.

We are not against having our new initiatives subjected to serious discussion by competent and responsible authorities. That is natural. But we are against having worn-out stereotypes advanced regarding alleged Soviet intentions to undermine and then break up Western Europe, and then to occupy it. Hence comes the faulty logic of some

Western leaders, that the idea of ridding Europe of its nuclear arsenals is harmful. Existing nuclear weapon systems have never before in postwar history been destroyed; they have only been limited. Now they could be destroyed, and this will be a very important step on the way toward a nuclear-free world. It is important that strategic stability be strengthened.

[Patsyuk] What is lacking under these conditions? What is the key to solving the problem? What do you think about that?

[Bogdanov] Given a display of political will on the part of the West, and first and foremost by the United States, the Soviet proposals for eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe could be implemented in the near future, and could secure a turning point in the world situation that the peoples of the world await in hope.

/8309

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW WEEKLY 'INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ROUNDTABLE'

LD171945 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 17 May 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program presented by Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, all-union radio commentator; with Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of all-union radio and television; and Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh, international affairs journalist]

[Excerpt][Levin] Hello, esteemed comrades. Although in our broadcasts of the "International Observers Roundtable" we primarily review events that have taken place in the current week, today we'll begin by looking a little way ahead. As you know, it was announced this week that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of our party's Central Committee, is to visit Romania. This visit is of great interest from the point of view of the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and from the point of view of the development of relations between all the states of the socialist community. It must be said that recently one has been able to note a considerable intensification of meetings, contacts, and talks.

Let us return to the events of this week. There was a conference of secretaries of Central Committees of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries who are engaged in dealing with questions of organizational party work. Delegations of the USSR Supreme Soviet -- one of them, which visited the DPRK, was led by Comrade Dolgikh, another delegation was led by Comrade Demichev and visited the People's Republic of Bulgaria. All these contacts, all these meetings, are to reveal more fully the potential of the community of socialist states -- for although we indeed have come a long way toward the development of socialist international relations, the possibilities are far from exhausted. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's recent visit to Czechoslovakia, for example, showed that. There is every reason to expect that Comrade Gorbachev's visit to Romania and his forthcoming talks with Comrade Ceausescu also will give a new boost to the development of relations between the Soviet Union and Socialist Romania, between our parties, and thereby will become one more element developing the socialist community.

[Kobyshev] By way of confirming what you already have said, Viktor Nikolayevich, I would like to make two observations: First, I have just returned from Czechoslovakia and saw there with my own eyes, felt, and observed how deeply the Czechoslovak public, the Czechoslovak Communists, and the whole Czechoslovak people have taken in Comrade Gorbachev's visit, and how attentively the restructuring that is taking place in our country is being followed there -- attentively, closely, with the very greatest interest, and with enormous sympathy, I must tell you. That is one point. The second is that Comrade Honecker, as it has become known, has just sent personal messages to Netherlands Prime Minister Lubbers, to British Prime Minister Thatcher, and to Belgian

Prime Minister Martens. The messages point out that Europe is now living through an especially crucial time. They state that the GDR retains in this sense its promise, agreed upon with the Soviet Union, under which once an accord has been reached on medium-range missiles, the operational and tactical missile complexes deployed in the GDR will be withdrawn. The idea of creating a corridor free of nuclear weapons in central Europe takes on a new significance precisely in light of the Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. So you see with what vigor, what dynamism -- everything has been set in motion in the Socialist world.

[Levin] Well, since you have mentioned the foreign policy activities of the socialist countries, one should, of course, recall that at the end of May -- as previously announced -- a session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee is to be held; and we are firmly convinced that the community of socialist states will surely take another new step in developing the proposals aimed at ensuring stability in Europe and providing security. We act in a coordinated way. You mentioned, Vitaliy Ivanovich, that if a treaty is signed on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles, the operational and tactical missiles will be removed from the GDR. But that also applies to Czechoslovakia and the nuclear-free corridor about which Comrade Honecker speaks and which is also supported by Czechoslovakia. A week earlier, Jaruzelski's plan was made public, which develops this idea still further. In other words, indeed all the socialist countries now are actively and purposefully intent on solving, I would say, the most vital problems facing Europe. There is surely no more vital problem today than eliminating medium-range missiles, because all the searches for ways toward military detente in Europe have, as it were, become focused on this problem, and if this can be achieved, then, first, we'll have taken the first real step toward eliminating an entire type of nuclear armaments -- that's the first thing; and second, of course, this would give a powerful boost to all the negotiations.

[Zorin] Nikolay Ivanovich, I think that's a correct assessment, and not because medium-range missiles are more important than any of the other problems that are now being examined in Geneva, but because an agreement on this question is possibly the most practicable thing in the foreseeable future. We have come very close to solving this problem; and I wouldn't regard it as impossible; it may happen that one day these days of May 1987 will go down in the history books read by our grandchildren: They will study the moment when, for the first time after many decades of a continuous build-up of the arms race we succeeded in taking the first step backward -- succeeded in agreeing to eliminate one of the dangerous types of weapons, in this case, medium-range missiles. However, having said those very promising optimistic words, I at once must say a very big but: Yes, the possibility of such a solution, which is being discussed and technically prepared at this very time, while we talk at the roundtable, is great. But, at the same time, one cannot overlook the fact that the closer we get to implementing that possibility, the greater the difficulties and resistance on the American side. Whereas before the start of the talks the leaders in Washington were making statements that were, I would say, mainly unreservedly optimistic, now they are not only making rather different statements, but the U.S. delegation is piling up obstacles in the way of reaching an agreement. There are several, but I'll draw our listeners' attention to just one. This is the problem of the Pershing-2 missiles. The Pentagon has devised the trick of not removing the Pershings but modifying them. The missile has two stages that make it medium-range: take out one stage and the Pershing will now be a reduced-range missile [raketa organizhennoy dalnosti] instead of a medium-range missile [raketa sredney dalnosti]

The shrewdness of this lies in the fact that, in the first place, the whole infrastructure is retained. When they were installing Pershings in Europe, they set up launch facilities, approach roads, depots -- altogether, quite a complex infrastructure. If this same truncated Pershing remains, then the infrastructure will also stay put. In second place, as experts acknowledge, the reverse operation -- replacing the stage -- would only take 48 hours, and what's more, it could actually be done on the launch sites, without the need to take the missile anywhere to do this. So that's the removal of the Pershings: an obvious ruse.

[Levin] I think it is a ruse with a subplot. It explains why pressure on the United States now is being organized in Western Europe -- though I think here it's the Americans themselves who are organizing the pressure -- against eliminating the operational tactical missiles.

If we have the double zero, as the Soviet Union is proposing, zero medium-range missiles and zero operational and tactical missiles, then there's no place left at all for Pershings' even in its truncated form. In order to keep it, they are saying: No, let us take one thing at a time; let us take it gradually. Of course, we have to do one thing at a time; we must not set ourselves too large a task at the present time. But, at the same time, we must not, as the old proverb had it, turn a pig into a carp. The position of the socialist countries is unambiguous; but as far as the position of the West is concerned; it's not straightforward. Sometimes it's more positive, sometimes less positive, sometimes negative. Let us begin describing the position of the West by talking about France's position, since talks with French Prime Minister Chirac took place in Moscow this week, and in the course of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's conversations with Chirac, in the course of Comrade Ryzhkov's talks with Chirac, these questions were constantly being raised.

[Kobysh] Yes, the question was raised about the fact that Soviet-French cooperation is of enormous, if not key, significance for the establishment of European peace. Well, it was said at the same time that we are far from satisfied with France's position at present, notably on the nuclear problem and questions of medium-range missiles: that it seems to us a strange position. That is the truth.

[Levin] Yes, unfortunately it is true. I say unfortunately because one would like to see France numbered among those states that are actively helping to solve the problems of military detente rather than making those problems worse. But we know France proceeds from the premise that nuclear weapons are a guarantee of peace -- a position that demonstrates, from our point of view, absolute incompetence.

[Kobysh] What is nuclear deterrence in our time? It amounts, in general, to the perpetuation of the existence of nuclear weapons as a permanent fixture, forever. I wish the French who so hotly advocate the idea of nuclear weapons would go to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Chernobyl and see what it means -- then they might become a little less enthusiastic. They might think that something else should be used for deterrence, reason first of all, and the human factor.

[Levin] These are very serious aspects, very serious. But in connection with the talks that have been held in Moscow with French Prime Minister Chirac, I think we can say that to expect that after this visit the head of the French Government would at once radically alter his government's approach to nuclear problems, to the problems of nuclear armaments, would probably be naive.

[Kobysh] Probably!

[Levin] Nevertheless, the dialogue did take place, and that dialogue indisputably has been useful. Why useful? We concurred on certain issues. On a few questions we were able to make headway. We now have a better and more precise idea of the position of the French side on the given issue; we've obtained an exposition....

[Kobysh, interrupting] At first hand.

[Levin] At first hand, from an authoritative source. That's useful. We see that dialogue, an exchange of opinions, even in those cases where it does not go very smoothly, does have a noticeable effect on development.

Now, in this connection -- I don't want to make a direct link between the stance recently adopted by Britain on the question of nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles and operational tactical missiles with Margaret Thatcher's visit to the Soviet Union....

[Kobysh] But it's Britain that's been the first among the leading Western countries to declare that it supports both zero options -- in other words, our proposal on medium-range missiles and our proposal on operational and tactical missiles.

[Levin] Let us take a look, then, at the position of the other European states.

[Kobysh] I would begin with something that one cannot fail to mention: the position of Bonn. At the moment, Bonn is the main factor in holding back NATO's decision on medium-range missiles. Now in Stavanger, in Norway, where the session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group has been taking place, this position on the part of the FRG has emerged clearly. We know that Bonn sent envoys to various capitals of the leading NATO countries to lobby against a decision being made on medium-range missiles. It has become known that when it was announced that Britain had made a decision on the two zeros at once -- both on medium-range missiles and on operational and tactical missiles -- it came as a shock to Bonn, because it was to London that they's sent their main group of these envoy-propagandists. And this was the very thing they were not expecting.

[Levin] But when we speak of Bonn, Vitaliy Ivanovich, we are bearing in mind that there are some people in the government, including Foreign Minister Genscher, who are in favor of the double zero: both for zero medium-range missiles and for zero operational and tactical missiles. Chancellor Kohl says: We reject Zero for operational and tactical missiles. Here it's very interesting to note that even in the government there is no full unanimity on this. The very fact that there are these different approaches reflects the clashes of opinion that now occur in Western Europe; they are occurring between countries; they are occurring within countries. A very pointed issue has emerged, a very pointed one. People who care about Europe's future, people who do not look at the development of the world through a device manufactured by the military-industrial complex, are undoubtedly making a more sober assessment of the situation. But we surely should not be speaking only of Britain, France, and the FRG; there are a great many other states in Europe as well, and the fate of Europe is their fate.

[Kobysh] Yes, and of course those states will have something to say, and their voice has a good deal of importance in NATO. Notice will have to be taken of their voices: the voice of Madrid, the voice of Athens, and the voices of the other countries of Western Europe. But for the moment Bonn is getting in the way. Britain's representative at the nuclear planning session in Norway, Younger, said, according to ASSOCIATED PRESS, that West Germany is now the main obstacle to working out a unified

position in NATO on the elimination of shorter and medium-range missiles [rakety ponizhennoy, sredney, dalnosti]. This is being linked with medium-range missiles. The question arises: To what extent is Bonn acting independently? Or is it some sort of game that's being played? Why Bonn in particular should be clinging to these missiles in this way is an interesting question, especially if just for the reason that only West Germany of the West European states has the Pershing-1 missiles, which are operational and tactical missiles. Here perhaps the matter is not at all so straightforward. Perhaps they don't want to give up those missiles.

[Levin] Even though it's being proposed on a mutual basis, still they don't want to. And of course this is something one cannot fail to notice. We've mentioned, incidentally, that the proposal is also being made in the United States that the Pershing-2 missiles should be altered and made into Pershing-1's.

This is also one explanation of why U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger is very resolutely and categorically against eliminating the operational and tactical missiles. At the same session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Stavanger, a new thesis emerged: The NATO men called on the Soviet Union to eliminate all their medium-range missiles, including those that could remain, according to the Reykjavik formula, in the Asian part of our country. The question arises: If we are conducting negotiations with the Americans on the basis of the Reykjavik formula, then why subvert it? After all, the Geneva talks themselves are far from simple. Yes, we agree in principle; but I don't think anyone would risk saying with confidence that an agreement will be elaborated this year. There is hope, and reason to hope -- but to assert firmly that everything already has been done, and that an agreement is certainly to be signed would be premature. Therefore this obvious attempt to make the negotiations more difficult can only put us on our guard.

[Kobysh] You've just touched on the question of the missiles in Asia. That, too, is quite an acute problem, and not a simple one, because for the Asian countries it's a question of their security, a question of their future.

[Levin] This question cannot be viewed in isolation from our general fundamental policy set out in the well-known statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev of 15 January 1986, in which we put forward a phased plan for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. There you have our answer to the question -- and any speculations, as soon as they are compared to the real facts, to our policy, and to our statement about the prospects of our policy, are at once exposed. That being so, NATO's way of putting the matter is a blatant attempt to complicate the talks.

[Zorin] It seems to me that there is not only maneuvering here, although maneuvering is taking place on the U.S. side. But I think a no less important reason is the contradictoriness of Washington's stance as such. There is no feeling that Washington has made a decision and speaks with one voice. All the more since this voice is to be heard in different ways. President Reagan speaks at times one way, at time another....

[Levin interrupts] A voice from one and the same mouth, even.

[Zorin] From the same mouth and almost at the same time. It is to be heard in different ways. Here matters are not so simple. The absence of this single voice reflects the process of a deep schism in which the Washington administration finds itself at present, and on very important issues. It isn't just a question of the fact that Reagan's presidency is on the wane, but that divergences have largely been disclosed in connection with the fact that a certain part of the ruling elite -- and it would be naive to consider that they're all semiliterate, that they're all frenzied there, and that they're all incapable of objectively analyzing a situation -- there are some more sensible politicians who have come to the conclusion that the line of confrontation, the line of attempting to find superiority over the Soviet Union which the administration has followed in its first period in power has not worked, and that some new ways have to be looked for. There are such people in the administration, and they are particularly numerous in Congress, bearing in mind as well, of course, the approaching election campaign.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1496

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW TV DOCUMENTARY ON 'NUCLEAR THREAT' IN EUROPE

LD160926 [Editorial report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1410 GMT on 15 May shows a 30-minute documentary film entitled "Peace to the European Home" written and introduced in the studio by Boris Kalyagin, showing the nuclear threat hanging over Europe, reviewing the European disarmament debate over the last decade or so, outlining Soviet arms initiatives, criticizing the U.S. Administration and its NATO allies for pursuing a policy of confrontation and outlining the benefits of peaceful cooperation in Europe.

In his introduction, Kalyagin says: "Hello there, comrades. The issue raised in the film we are about to show -- the reduction of nuclear armaments in Europe -- has today become perhaps the most topical and important problem in international politics. This is thanks to the initiative of our country. We have proposed that the European home be rid of a considerable proportion of the nuclear arsenals that have accumulated in it. Moreover, we have at the same time tried to consider the wishes of the United States and its West European allies -- in particular, President Reagan's so-called zero option. We have proposed a plan for ridding Europe of a whole class of nuclear missile weaponry -- medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. A rather strange picture is emerging, however. No sooner do we take steps to meet the West halfway than the West immediately seems to lose interest in its own proposals and begins to erect fresh obstacles in the way of an agreement.

"It turns out that the Western leaders are not interested in reducing nuclear armaments in Europe, but in equalizing their levels -- in other words, in building up their missiles. One has to ask what sort of disarmament that is!

"Our latest initiative regarding operational and tactical missiles was undertaken after the film was finished, and the film does not deal with it. It is possible that some new nuances will emerge during negotiations. But the main thing -- and the film reflects this -- remains unchanged. We are striving to achieve genuine security for Europe and to switch to radical reductions in all types of armaments and armed forces on the continent, with due regard for the security interests of all parties. A unique opportunity for this has now arisen. Whether this historical opportunity will be used depends on the stance of Washington and its NATO partners."

Over opening shots contrasting the tourist sights and cultural monuments of the capitals of Europe with Greenham Common's cruise missiles and war games on British soil, the commentary said that "the spirit of enmity and estrangement still hovers over the continent." "The Land of the Soviets is presented as enemy number one." Shots of Western military hardware were accompanied by the statement that Europe was "over-saturated" with weapons. The film said that Europe was too small and fragile to survive the "catastrophe" that the use of military force would bring.

The film recalled the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, calling it a "European peace charter." "Helsinki saw the birth of the hope that enmity and mistrust could be overcome, that relations between countries with different social systems could be built on the principles of detente."

From shots of the Helsinki conference and swaying corn fields, the film cut to shots of Weinberger attending a NATO meeting and military hardware: "Far from everyone in the West found this policy to their liking. The Final Act was signed by the United States, but the American administration did not want to reckon with the agreement it had approved. The White House called detente a one-way street. In Washington, particular irritation was caused by the principle of observing equal security for all states. It was against this most important provision that a blow was struck." In deciding in 1979 to deploy cruise missiles and Pershings in Europe, "the United States and its NATO allies intended to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union -- an "unrealistic" objective. The result of the cruise and Pershing deployments was to make the Western Europeans the "nuclear hostages of Washington." The population of Europe was given the role of "target for a nuclear counterstrike." Clips from a British film showing the aftermath of a nuclear blast over St Paul's Cathedral were shown.

The film showed protests in Britain and other countries against the "cruise death." There were shots of Reagan and Gorbachev during the Geneva summit; of the security and disarmament conference in Stockholm. The Stockholm conference showed that mutually acceptable solutions could be found "if one is guided by a new approach to international affairs."

Gorbachev's proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons totally by the beginning of the 21st century was noted as an example of the "new thinking." Reykjavik showed the reality of the Soviet proposal for a nonnuclear world: The USSR and United States "practically reached an accord on the elimination of strategic nuclear armaments and medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe." The two leaders were shown during the Reykjavik summit.

The film showed children sending appeals for peace to Gorbachev and Reagan. "But the children's appeals do not reach the U.S. President."

"It seems that certain Western European leaders have become so accustomed to nuclear weapons that they cannot imagine their existence without it. The deliberately false argument that the scrapping of nuclear weapons would upset the balance in favour of the socialist countries, which allegedly have superiority in conventional weapons, was put into play." In Budapest, the Warsaw Pact states called for cuts in armed forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals. A clip from the Warsaw Pact meeting was shown. "What is missing that would allow these radical proposals to be adopted? Evidently, the main thing -- the political will on the part of the governments of Western countries. Some are hampered by the fact that mistrust has taken root, others regard as paramount the profits of the military-industrial complex, and still others calculate that the arms race will weaken the Soviet Union. But these intentions are deluded.

"The interests of all peoples suffer as a result of the arms race. And the curbing of the arms race would not only reduce the military threat, but would open the floodgates to wide-ranging, peaceful cooperation." Footage of an amphibious landing exercise was shown. The film showed the launch of the dry-cargo vessel Kemerovo, built for the USSR in Finland. The launch of the MV Dalnerechensk was also shown as an example of economic cooperation. The film recalled Soviet-French space cooperation and showed film of the Bolshoy's London tour and of the recent Moscow forum for the survival of humanity, with a clip of Gorbachev's speech. Over shots of peace demonstrations, the film said that the arms race was the "supreme evil on our planet." "It has a large number of influential supporters in the West. And yet, even there they are an insignificant minority."

"Today, thanks to Soviet initiatives, there is a real opportunity to rid the continent of Europe of a significant part of its nuclear burden. In line with the Reykjavik accord, we have proposed in the next 5 years to scrap all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. This historic opportunity must not be missed." The choice facing Europe was "peaceful coexistence or nonexistence." Over shots of tourists and pigeons, the film concluded that Europe could set an example of "new political thinking -- the strengthening of detente." "Peaceful competition and cooperation, not enmity and confrontation, will provide the European home with security."

/8309

CSO: 5200/1496

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW TV: U.S. TO EXPAND NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN BRITAIN

OW150511 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1045 GMT 13 May 87

["The World Today" program, presented by Valeriy Korzin]

[Text] This is how U.S. bombers took off from airfields in the United Kingdom to drop their deadly cargoes on Libyan cities.

[Video shows KC-10 tanker taking off] Echoes from that terrorist action can be heard to this day, and above all in the UK which, under pressure from Washington, became a participant in this operation.

The incident once again drew attention to itself through the U.S. intention to deploy strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom. The DAILY EXPRESS reported that the United States intends to strengthen its nuclear forces in the United Kingdom by deploying B-52 bombers and by increasing the number of F-111 fighter bombers in Great Britain.

This plan is supposed to convince Western Europe of the reliability of the U.S. nuclear shield.

A scheduled NATO session will begin work in Norway in the middle of May and, in the opinion of the DAILY EXPRESS, Weinberger intends to make public his plan at this session. The plan obviously will be discussed behind closed doors by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, and, equally obviously, those Englishmen who consider that with each new U.S. bomber on their territory, the independence of their country, the United Kingdom is diminished, will not be consulted.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1496

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SPAIN'S GONZALEZ, BELGIUM'S MARTENS AGREE ON EUROMISSILES

PM111311 Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 30 Apr 87 p 9

[Fernando Baeta report: "Gonzalez Does Not Wish To Link Euromissiles Reductions With Those of Conventional Forces"]

[Excerpts] Madrid--Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez and Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens agreed yesterday that the negotiations between the United States and the USSR on the elimination of Euromissiles should not be dependent on the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe.

The Spanish prime minister said at a joint press conference that "the conclusion should not be reached that an agreement on Euromissiles cannot be reached if there is no agreement on conventional weapons. It is necessary to go for an agreement on Euromissiles and then discuss conventional weapons."

Martens said that his country hopes that "when an agreement on INF is reached, a possible agreement on the short-range missiles can also be secured. Naturally, this would arouse new expectations about conventional weapons, and the NATO countries should negotiate the reduction of those weapons in order to achieve also the greatest possible balance."

The two men were in agreement that the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union affect the European countries very directly.

The two prime ministers stated that their stances in the security sphere are convergent, and they want an agreement to be reached on the basis of the zero-zero option, which would entail the elimination of all Euromissiles with a range between 500 km and 5,500 km.

Felipe Gonzalez also said that these latest developments in the sphere of relations between the two blocs will not cause the

Spanish Government to reconsider the need to change the terms of last year's referendum — "That would be to run counter to the people's wishes," he said — and he pointed out that Spain is the only country in the alliance to join it by means of a plebiscite.

The Spanish head of government made this statement after the Belgian prime minister spoke of his country's "sacrifices" and "commitments" — including allowing the deployment of INF missiles — in Europe's defense.

Belgium, which together with Britain is the Atlantic partner which least understands our stance on full integration into NATO, believes that Spain's ambiguity is not in keeping with the new departure experienced in relations between the two blocs.

At the dinner held for him by Felipe Gonzalez, Wilfried Martens used his speech to state that "all countries should reflect on the new imperatives of this collective security within the changed atmosphere in East-West relations. We should all reach conclusions in a firm and open spirit, jointly and separately, and accept the necessary adjustments and sacrifices."

/8309

CSO: 5200/2534

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BEIJING REVIEW CALLS U.S. RESERVATIONS 'MAIN BLOCK'

OW110924 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English 27 Apr 87 p 10

[Article by Wan Di: "Arms Control: Sun Peeps Through the Clouds"]

[Text] The deadlock in U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations seems to have finally been breached. During his three-day visit to the Soviet Union, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz offered a formal response to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to open talks on removing short-range missiles from Europe, which would pave the way for an agreement to reduce medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. He explained the American stance on this matter in detail. Though differences remain, both sides say they are closer to an accord on this issue and agreed to leave Euromissile reductions and verification to negotiators at the Geneva talks, which are to open next month.

The Euromissile deal, which has taken shape since last October's summit in Iceland, means removing Soviet SS-20 and U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles from Europe. But each side would retain 100 warheads elsewhere. In February, the Soviets dropped their demand for a link between Euromissiles and the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Despite the change, the U.S. insisted on linking the Euromissile pact to a deal on short-range missiles in the belief that removing Euromissiles would leave the Soviets with a great advantage in short-range weapons.

On the eve of Shultz's Moscow visit, a message came from Gorbachev in Prague that negotiations on short-range missiles should run concurrently with talks on the intermediate nuclear force (INF) in Europe. Gorbachev's new overtures received a reserved welcome from U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who said, "We have never believed in linking those two weapons systems, but we have believed negotiations should be simultaneous."

The main block to a complete success of the Moscow talks is the U.S. reservation about Gorbachev's new offer. Shultz said at a press conference following his Moscow visit that Washington has the right to develop short-range missiles and deploy them in numbers approximately equal to those of the Soviet Union before an agreement to set ceilings on the number of such missiles is reached. The U.S. side has long referred to destroying all INF worldwide instead of removing only Euromissiles. But this time Shultz said that if the Soviets insist that each side retain 100 warheads outside Europe, the United States might have to keep the Soviets company. Finally, it is most important for the U.S. to consult with its allies about Gorbachev's new offer before any accord can be hammered out.

During this U.S.-Soviet talks, Gorbachev also made a new suggestion about SDI, saying Moscow would not object to any sort of land-based testing of the system. In addition, he explained clearly for the first time the meaning of the term "laboratory," which has been the subject of wrangling by both sides the Iceland summit. Gorbachev pointed out that it meant SDI research work could be carried out on the ground--"in institutes, at proving grounds, at plants." Gorbachev's statement on SDI was a response to Reagan's decision just before Shultz's visit to trim the time limit for observing the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty from 10 to 5 years. Gorbachev called his new offer a compromise decision and final effort.

Gorbachev replied to an invitation by U.S. President Reagan to visit Washington by expressing interest. He said he hoped for a summit this year but needed "serious business" to justify the trip. He said that since he was not near retirement, he could not travel just for pleasure. Observers noted that Gorbachev would only go to Washington to sign an accord on medium-range missiles, otherwise he would not.

Shultz's visit was shadowed by quarrels over "penetration" of each nation's embassies, the outgrowth of a sex-and-spy scandal in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. "But when he left for Western Europe to informalities of his talks with the Soviets, the climate seemed brighter, thanks to new hopes for arms control.

/8309

CSO: 5200/4001

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY ON WESTERN EUROPE STRENGTHENING DEFENSE

HK040555 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 1 May 87 p 3

[Commentary by RENMIN RIBAO reporter Yao Li (1202 4539): "'Relying More on Oneself'--West European Defense in Relation to the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-Range Missile Talks"]

[Text] In recent days, security and defense have once again become hot topics in West European political and press circles. On 28 April, the foreign and defense ministers of the seven-member Western European Union held a meeting in Luxembourg. In addition to discussing the position West European countries should adopt regarding the U.S.-Soviet intermediate-range missile talks, they especially stressed the need for the West European defense industry to "cooperate more closely and in a more balanced way."

West European countries have developed a "sense of crisis" on the defense issue and therefore called for better defense cooperation. The new situation in U.S.-Soviet intermediate-missile talks has posed this issue to Western Europe. The United States and the Soviet Union will probably reach an agreement on intermediate-range missiles very soon. This has not only encouraged West European countries but also started them thinking of other aspects of the problem: If the intermediate-range missiles are removed from Europe, to be followed by a "zero option" on short-range missiles, will Europe follow a "non-nuclear" path? Will the security system of West European and NATO countries, which has been maintained on the strength of the "nuclear deterrent" strategy, become insecure? Will West European security face the threat of absolute Soviet superiority in conventional weapons? These misgivings and fears cannot but make West European countries promptly consider these consequences and strive to make future European defense "rely more on its own strength." In Brussels not long ago, British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe called on European countries to "further step up defense cooperation without damaging the Atlantic alliance and to assume greater responsibilities for common security." It is by no means accidental that his speech evoked strong repercussions in West European public opinion.

Since March, France, Britain, and West Germany have held frequent consultations on West European security. They also considered setting up in Europe a "political power center to decide its own security measures." More significantly, Britain and France have gone beyond the "forbidden zone" of "independent nuclear forces" that has never been touched upon before and have begun exploring the possibility of defense cooperation, including nuclear defense cooperation. According to Western public opinion, its importance does not lie in the possibility of a major policy decision in the near future. It lies in the fact that the two governments have realized the need to relegate historic differences to second place for the sake of joint security and common interests. Obviously this is of great significance. Moreover, there have been developments by

France and Germany in defense cooperation. Last March, the two countries reached agreement on a plan to jointly manufacture a new type of anti-tank helicopter, which had been stalled for 3 years. France and Spain are also vigorously seeking to step up cooperation in the production of army weapons, mainly armored cars. Although deliberations on such cooperation have been going on for several years and although the current scale of cooperation cannot be regarded as large, it shows, however, that Western Europe is marching forward step by step, with cooperation in the defense industry as a beginning.

Not only have West European security and defense become a topic of discussion in the political circles, but the public has also showed great concern about these issues.
[paragraph continues]

A survey conducted in West Germany, Britain, France, and Italy by a European polling group shows that most Britons, Frenchmen, and Italians, and 44 percent of West Germans favor setting up a West European defense independent of the United States and NATO. Even the Frenchmen, who have consistently favored defending the national interest as a primary task, have increasingly come to realize the need to strive for the building of a common defense system in Europe. This is vastly different from the previous ideas of the West Europeans and this change of sentiment undoubtedly promotes the strengthening of West European defense.

In short, with the development in U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly the new situation in the current East-West relations, the security and defense of Western Europe have been placed higher on the West European countries' agenda. However, it is unrealistic to hold that Western Europe will from now on set aside the U.S. nuclear umbrella and develop its own independent nuclear forces. In fact, West Europeans will not do so. On the contrary, they will try by every means to pin down the United States lest the West European defense be decoupled from the U.S. defense. Moreover, it is unimaginable that the United States will wash its hands of Western Europe for the sake of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union. Western Europe pays close attention to its own defense and strengthens its defense cooperation so that, in the event its defense is weakened or a gap appears in its defense as a result of the bypassing diplomacy [yue ding wai jiao 6390 7307 1120 0074] between the United States and the Soviet Union, West Europe can fill the gap. As Jacques Poos, executive president of the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union and Luxembourg's foreign affairs minister, put it, maintaining U.S. forces in Western Europe is "indispensable" and only more "self-help" can ensure more security because "a subordinate position cannot make people share weal and woe." The significance and importance of the West European countries' recent efforts in defense also precisely lie here.

/8309

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC JOURNAL ANALYZES SOVIET 'ZERO OPTION' PLAN

HK150930 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 19, 11 May 87 pp 22-23

[Article by Li Qinggong (2621 1987 0501): "Another Soviet 'Zero Option' Plan"]

[Text] People are not unfamiliar with the "zero option" plan proposed at the U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range nuclear weapons. But while the United States and the Soviet Union were repeatedly conducting dialogues on this plan aiming to conclude an agreement, Soviet leader Gorbachev recently proposed another "zero option" plan on short-range nuclear weapons, thereby changing his original hard-line stand and giving rise to the possibility of new progress at the current U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range nuclear weapons.

There was a change in the Soviet stand on short-range nuclear weapons. After the U.S.-Soviet summit in Iceland last October, the United States proposed that the issue of short-range nuclear weapons also be taken into account when discussing the elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, in an attempt to get rid of the Soviet "9 to 1" superiority in this field. The Soviet Union was opposed to this at that time and thought that the U.S. "package plan" was a big obstacle to the talks on medium-range nuclear weapons. For this reason, the Soviet Union proposed a "freezing" program, which was used as a countermeasure to the U.S. "upward balance" program. A relevant change took place in the Soviet stand on short-range nuclear weapons following its shift from "relating" the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons with that of space weapons to "separating" these two issues. On 28 February this year, while suggesting that an agreement be concluded immediately on the question of medium-range nuclear weapons, Gorbachev expressed his willingness to start negotiations on the question of short-range nuclear weapons. But he still objected to taking this question as a precondition for concluding an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons. On 10 April, during his visit to Czechoslovakia, Gorbachev stepped a little further from his original stand. He said that a discussion should start on the reduction and final elimination of the 500 to 1,000 km short-range missiles (also called "medium short-range missiles") deployed in Europe, but pointed out that this discussion "should not be conducted in connection with the process and results of the settlement of the question concerning medium-range nuclear weapons." When he met U.S. Secretary of State Shultz on 14 April in Moscow, Gorbachev proposed a "zero option" plan on short-range nuclear weapons which demanded the "elimination of all short-range nuclear weapons in Europe" after the signing of an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons. Apart from that, he agreed to the U.S. proposal that the question of short-range nuclear weapons will be taken as a "part of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms talks and of the agreement on the talks." Subsequently, the Soviet Union proposed a series of supplementary suggestions on the "zero option," plan.

The Soviet "zero option" plan to reduce short-range nuclear weapons involves a high target, covers a short period, and deals with a large variety of nuclear arms. the

plan not only demands that the Soviet Union eliminate all of its short-range nuclear weapons, but also requires the United States to perform the same task. The time limit is "1 year" after the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons. The elimination of "all short-range nuclear weapons" includes not only 500 to 1,000 km medium short-range missiles, but also battlefield tactical missiles and nuclear artillery shells with a range below 500 km. [paragraph continues]

Thus, Soviet SS-12, SS-22, and SS-23 medium short-range missiles, as well as its "Sandal" and "Frog-7" short-range missiles and nuclear artillery shells; U.S. "Pershing II" medium short-range missiles as well as its "Lance" short-range missiles and nuclear artillery shells are all on the elimination list.

The Soviet "zero option" plan originally involved only the European region but was subsequently expanded to cover the Asian region "from the Urals to the Pacific." U.S. soil is included in the provisions of the plan. The plan requires the exercising of "strict examination and supervision" over the dismantling of missiles and the location for eliminating missiles, and over launch sites, warehouses, and even private factories. Not only must the United States and the Soviet Union supervise each other, but the launch sites and military bases of a third country must also be examined.

The Soviet "zero option" plan on short-range nuclear weapons was proposed out of consideration for both immediate and long-term needs. It is an expression of Gorbachev's "new political ideas" in the disarmament field. An analysis indicates that the Soviet Union harbors the following intentions.

In the past, the Soviet Union used emptiness to tackle emptiness, and tried to regain the initiative. After the Iceland summit last year, when proposing to "settle the issue on short-range nuclear weapons," the United States wanted to take it as a precondition for resolving the question of medium-range nuclear weapons, with the aim of increasing its counters at the disarmament talks. The United States thought that the Soviet Union would not accept it since the Soviet Union is superior to the United States in short-range nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, at that time, did object to this proposal and was suspected of not being sincere in wanting to conclude an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons. As a result, it found itself in a passive position during the seventh round of disarmament talks. The "zero option" plan was a step taken by the Soviet Union to change its passive position. Although this plan involves various aspects, it lacks practicability. Technically speaking, the elimination of all short-range nuclear weapons is feasible; but in practice, it is difficult to put it into effect because it involves the U.S. allies in Western Europe. It is all the more difficult to complete it within "1 year." In the first place, the United States will find it difficult to agree to this. Thus it can be seen that the Soviet "zero option" plan is aimed at exercising Soviet forbearance on the question of disarmament, at putting the United States on the spot, and at gaining the upper hand in future disarmament talks.

The Soviet Union asked for higher prices and tried to get rid of U.S. plans. At that time, the United States wished to resolve the question of short-range nuclear weapons, aimed to achieve an "upward balance," and wanted to take this as a supplement to the "zero option" on medium-range nuclear weapons. To put it more specifically, after the medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe are reduced to "zero," the United States wanted to maintain a certain nuclear deterrent and reserve NATO's "flexible and responsive" strategy through increasing NATO's short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, in particular through transforming its "Pershing II" missiles into short-range missiles. The Soviet Union was very worried about the U.S. program. On the one hand, it feared that the

United States might take this opportunity to expand its short-range nuclear strength, since it is easier to increase short-range nuclear weapons in Europe than to deploy medium-range nuclear weapons there. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was worried that the United States would lower its threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, such as by using short-range nuclear weapons, and in particular, by using battlefield tactical missiles and nuclear artillery shells with a range below 500 kms, thus taking less military and political risks than it would take to launch medium-range nuclear weapons. [paragraph continues]

Out of this consideration, the Soviet Union shifted from its original "freezing" stand to the "zero option," with the aim of getting rid of the U.S. "upward balance" program and eliminating the presence of U.S. nuclear strength in Europe.

It took the opportunity to gain strategic superiority. The Soviet Union had a deeper thought in proposing the second "zero option" plan. Through the double "zero option" plan the Soviet Union tried to realize the target of "a nuclear free central Europe" and finally achieve the end of "nonnuclearization of all of Europe," with the aim of better utilizing the strategic role of its conventional military forces and finally gaining strategic superiority for its conventional forces in Europe. The Soviet Union is well aware that NATO, headed by the United States, uses its nuclear forces to supplement its conventional forces and to maintain the position of its conventional forces. In the "flexible and responsive" strategy, NATO will take its strategic choice by making nuclear reprisals. Following the technological development of nuclear weapons, the limited use of nuclear weapons is becoming more and more possible. The elimination of all nuclear weapons in Europe will make the "flexible and responsive" strategy of the United States and NATO unfounded. It will also bring an essential change in the balance of military forces between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the latter maintaining strategic superiority over the former.

The 'zero option' plan is aimed at Western Europe and aims to create conflicts between the United States and Europe. As the Soviet Union is well aware, Western Europe has adequate authority to clarify its stand on the question of European missiles and has a direct impact on the U.S. position concerning the disarmament talks. In addition, Western Europe has contradicting thoughts on the "zero option" plan on medium-range nuclear weapons, and hopes that the United States and the Soviet Union can conclude an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons, but at the same time fears that the United States and Europe will be "strategically disconnected." The U.S. proposal on resolving the question of short-range nuclear weapons is, in fact, a West European proposal. The Soviet Union has taken advantage of Western Europe's contradictory thoughts on the "zero option" plan on short-range nuclear weapons. The plan is trying hard to bring about strategic disconnection between the United States and Europe through the elimination of all the U.S. nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Also, the Soviet Union is expecting the United States to stay in the talks because the latter might be afraid of being charged with "undermining the disarmament talks." If this happens, the problems between the United States and Western Europe will deteriorate. Without the support of Western Europe, the U.S. position at the disarmament talks will certainly weaken, and this, undoubtedly, will benefit the Soviet Union.

It is fanning out from point to area and is speeding up the process of negotiations. Now almost everyone believes that in the three spheres of the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks, it is possible that an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons will be concluded ahead of the other two. The United States and the Soviet Union also hope that an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons can be concluded this year and formally signed at the U.S.-Soviet summit in Washington. The question of short-range nuclear weapons has now become a crucial point in the U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range nuclear weapons and has a direct impact on the process of the talks. By proposing the second "zero option" plan, the Soviet Union has greatly changed its stand on short-range nuclear weapons. This suggests that the Soviet Union is trying to speed up the process of the disarmament talks. On the one hand, it is striving for the early conclusion of an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons through the settlement of the question of short-range nuclear weapons. [paragraph continues]

On the other hand, it is aiming to create an excellent atmosphere for the talks in the other two spheres for the purpose of making progress favorable to the Soviet Union at the talks on strategic nuclear weapons, and in particular on space weapons. This was one of the main purposes for the Soviet Union to propose the first "zero option" plan.

The Soviet "zero option" plan on short-range nuclear weapons has aroused positive repercussions in some countries, but there are also quite a number of unstable factors. The United States was taken by surprise. Gorbachev himself said that this "was beyond U.S. expectations." The United States' direct response was that it wanted to consult with its West European allies to coordinate their stand on this proposal. To what extent the United States will accept this proposal and whether or not it will dish out a new proposal or a counterproposal remains to be seen.

As history indicates in the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks, the process from making verbal commitments to reaching unanimity of understanding, and from concluding a written agreement to putting it into effect has been a long process full of ups and downs. The settlement of the question of short-range nuclear weapons will undergo the same process. What impact the possible change in the process of the talks on short-range nuclear weapons will produce on the talks on medium-range nuclear weapons, on the entire disarmament talks, and, in particular, on the U.S.-Soviet summit this year, is very difficult to appraise.

/8309

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC PREMIER ON COMMON INTERESTS OF CHINA, WESTERN EUROPE

OW111946 Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin 0930 GMT 11 May 87

[Excerpts] The Chinese Government held a grand ceremony at the East Gate Square of the Great Hall of the People this morning to warmly welcome Rudolphus Lubbers, prime minister of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, who is on an official visit to China.

Zhao Ziyang said: Since the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have not changed their basic strategies, it is hard to say the international situation has really relaxed. He stressed: The disarmament issue should not be decided by the two superpowers alone. They should respect and heed the views of the large numbers of small and medium-sized countries. He said: We disagree with the Soviet idea of removing its medium-range missiles [from Europe] but keeping the medium-range missiles in Asia. Disarmament should not be limited to nuclear weapons, but also include conventional arms. We understand West European countries' concern about the reduction of conventional arms in Europe. China regards Western Europe as a force in maintaining peace. There is no basic conflict of interests between China and Western Europe. In fact, they share common ground on many major issues.

Lubbers agreed with Zhao Ziyang. He said: The current political climate in Europe is very good. Europe has become more united and is playing a more important role in disarmament.

/8309

CSO: 5200/4099

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CHINA DAILY ON THREAT OF ASIAN-BASED MISSILES

HK150245 Beijing CHINA DAILY in English 15 May 87 p 4

[By unidentified CHINA DAILY commentator from 'Opinion' column: "Missile Talks"]

[Text] With signs of a possible breakthrough, the prolonged Soviet-U.S. Geneva nuclear arms control talks have aroused greater interest than previously from the world community in the last two months.

In February, the Soviet Union dropped its insistence that any accord on medium-range missiles deployed in Europe be linked to the Strategic Defence Initiative issue and called for a separate agreement. In mid-April, it proposed the unilateral dismantling of its shorter-range missiles in Europe in exchange for the United States giving up the right to place such missiles there. As a result, the superpowers seemed to be getting much closer in their positions on the medium-range missile issue.

Observers have begun to predict that some sort of an agreement can be reached which could make a substantial cut in nuclear arms for the first time.

China has consistently held that the superpowers, possessing more than 90 per cent of the world's nuclear arsenal, should take the lead in paring it down. Only last week senior leader Deng Xiaoping, regarding relations between the two superpowers, said dialogue is better than confrontation and small-scale disarmament preferable to no disarmament at all.

However, according to its proposal, the Soviet Union will still keep 100 medium-range warheads on its Asian territory while the U.S. will have the same number on its own soil. This will inevitably pose a threat not only to the security of Asian countries but also to world peace. It is quite justifiable for the Chinese Government to urge that the superpowers reduce their medium-range missiles in both Europe and Asia simultaneously and in a balanced way until all are completely destroyed.

Since world peace is indivisible and of common concern to the peoples of all nations, the disarmament issue should not be dominated exclusively by the two superpowers. The opinions of other countries should be listened to and respected.

Quite a number of statesmen have voiced their views. While welcoming the Soviet proposal, New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange has pointed out that the 100 medium-range warheads to be retained in Asia will cause concern in the countries of the Asian and Pacific region. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has said that medium-range missiles should be eliminated not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world.

Moreover, disarmament will be incomplete if conventional weapons are left untouched. The world community has sufficient reason to demand that the superpowers take the lead in reducing conventional armaments in the interest of world peace at the same time they reduce nuclear armaments. Western Europe's apprehension about the existing disparity in conventional forces is a real one, which deserves greater attention.

As a developing socialist country, China needs a peaceful world environment for a long time to come. It has never shirked its own commitment to disarmament. China has announced that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons and the reduction of the Chinese armed forces by a million men, as announced in 1985, has been by and large completed. This nation will certainly continue to work for relaxing tension and maintaining peace in the world.

/8309

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ON FRG'S KOHL CONCERNED OVER INF DEVELOPMENTS

OW170926 Beijing XINHUA in English 0738 GMT 17 May 87

["News Analysis: Kohl Walks Boldly Onto INF Stage (by Xia Zhimian)"--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Bonn, May 16 (XINHUA) -- Federal German Chancellor Helmut Kohl issued a hasty statement Friday, saying that nuclear disarmament talks should also cover missiles with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers. Kohl had neither consulted Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher over the surprising statement, nor discussed it with his cabinet.

There are two factors forcing Kohl to make such a statement.

The first is the British statement issued Thursday, saying Britain would accept the two "zero options" to scrap first the medium-range missiles, which reach from 1,000 to 5,000 kilometers, and second the shorter-range missiles, with ranges of 500 to 1,000 kilometers, in Europe on the condition that Europe's security would be guaranteed.

During the two-day session of the nuclear planning group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, most of the European countries tended to accept the Soviet proposal to eliminate both medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe. Federal Germany appeared isolated in its opposition. This is a second reason behind Kohl's Friday statement.

The Kohl government, with the exception of Genscher, has been trying to form a West European coalition to prevent the United States from accepting the second "zero option" on shorter-range missiles. But Kohl's opposition has put him in a difficult situation both at home and abroad, as public opinion favors the removal of both categories of missiles. He is forced to change his stand.

The talks about nuclear weapons in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union cover only the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces [INF] and the shorter-range missiles. The scope of the U.S.-Soviet arms talks was expanded when Kohl mentioned the nuclear missiles with a range of under 1500 kilometers.

It is obvious that Kohl is trying to become active in the INF issue and to change the country's image as a stumbling block in the U.S.-Soviet arms talks.

It is also a politically astute move: He issued the statement before elections in two federal states are held on May 17.

Another subtle advantage of insisting on negotiations to eliminate missiles under 1,000 kilometers is that it paves the way for Federal Germany to accept the double "zero option" to scrap both the medium- and shorter-range missiles.

In his Friday statement he didn't mention his opposition to eliminating nuclear weapons in Europe, as he has before. He only emphasised that the security of European states must be secured.

Minister of the Chancellor's Office Wolfgang Schaeuble said it is wrong to say that Kohl really wants to eliminate nuclear weapons in Europe, but he doesn't reject the second zero option either. Another official of the Chancellor's office said it is possible for Federal Germany to accept the double "zero option" under certain conditions.

The third purpose of Kohl's statement is to prevent the United States and the Soviet Union from eliminating only medium-range missiles and not the shorter-range ones as well.

If the United States and the Soviet Union reach an agreement on the "zero-zero option", the Soviets would eliminate the threat of U.S. missiles in Europe and Europe would be rid of Soviet missiles.

The missiles of under 500 kilometers would be concentrated in the two Germanies, which form the military borders of the two European alliances. If a partial nuclear war breaks out, all European victims would be Germans.

The recent NATO defense ministers' meeting showed that the United States and some allies want to expand their shorter-range missiles in Federal Germany after the "zero-zero option" is reached. This is why most Federal German politicians oppose the second "zero option", and some even the option on medium-range missiles.

Kohl's purpose to take the missiles of under 500 kilometers into account is to force other European nations into sharing the danger posed by the nuclear weapons that would remain in Europe after a double zero option agreement is reached.

Kohl's statement shows that the Federal German Government is trying to become active in the issue. But whether this ideal hope can come true is uncertain.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan is going to West Berlin in June to celebrate the 750th anniversary of the founding of Berlin. The Federal Government is expected to try again to persuade the United States to take into account Federal Germany's fears.

/8309

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

IRANIANS SAY ITALIAN COMPANY SUPPLIES CHEMICAL WEAPONS

AU231035 Rome ANSA in English 1013 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Text](ANSA) Rome, April 23 — The Iranian Embassy in Rome has called on the international community, and in particular Italy, to condemn the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, in its Gulf conflict with Iran.

Yesterday's communique recalled that on April 7 and 8 Iraq launched "numerous" missiles, containing chemical substances, against the Iranian city of Khorramshar and that Tehran has asked the United Nations to send an observer team to examine the "disastrous effects" of the attack.

"These continual crimes by the Iraqi military" the note affirmed, "occur at the time a new international accord on chemical weapons is being prepared and are nothing less than an insult to international norms".

The Iranian Embassy communique called on Italy to express "its firm and vigorous condemnation of these acts" and went on to affirm that Italy's chemical giant Montedison was one of the suppliers of material for chemical weapons.

/8309

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: JARUZELSKI PLAN FOR EUROPEAN ARMS CUTS PRAISED

Foreign Ministry Spokesman

AU150855 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 13 May 87 p 6

[Statement made to TRYBUNA LUDU by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Office of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs--date not given]

[Text] Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski's initiative is very important and embraces a broad range of problems whose solution would help curb the number of nuclear and conventional weapons in the region in which the two political-military groups are in contact. The realization of the Jaruzelski plan could help decrease the level of confrontation in Europe and favor accelerated disarmament.

The USSR has always been pleased to welcome initiatives of the fraternal socialist countries on international affairs and their contribution toward joint efforts to make the world and Europe safer.

Poland's militance in world policy is universally known and enjoys respect. The Gomulka and Rapacki Plans have their place in history as initiatives seeking to consolidate peace and security.

Poland has now made the following initiatives:

-- It has put forward another plan-program for gradually withdrawing and reducing jointly stipulated operational and tactical nuclear weapons. As Comrade Jaruzelski stressed, all the kinds of these weapons should be included in appropriate negotiations.

-- It has proposed gradually withdrawing and reducing jointly stipulated kinds of conventional weapons, first of all -- which is most important -- all those that are most powerful and accurate in their destructive power. This measure would curb opportunities for sudden attack.

-- It has proposed to change military doctrines from offensive to strictly defensive.

As I said at my news conference (Gerasimov presented the Soviet stand on the Polish plan at the Tuesday briefing for foreign journalists -- TRYBUNA LUDU), we think the implementation of Jaruzelski's plan could become an important element of Europe's stabilization. Polish proposals are also of great importance for the positive development of the entire pan-European process. It can be assumed that the Polish plan will be one of the subjects of the coming session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in Berlin.

I would like to draw attention to a number of especially important features of the Polish initiatives. First the plan not only provides for arms reductions, but also favors strengthening the countries' mutual trust by tackling the issue of military doctrines. Second, it defines the territorial limits that can be extended to other countries. Third, it helps to overcome the stalemate of the Vienna negotiations on mutual reductions of armed continued for many years and have so far achieved nothing. Jaruzelski's plan may help the negotiations leave the blind alley into which they have strayed.

Presenting first impressions of Jaruzelski's plan, it is necessary to note the open nature of his proposals. We could say the plan provides for four lines of action, but, at the same time, makes it possible to thoroughly discuss these proposals and give them concrete form.

The integrated [calosciowy] and comprehensive [kompleksowy] character of the plan is interesting. The plan speaks of tactical and operational nuclear weapons and of those conventional weapons that should be reduced to an agreed level because they constitute a special danger. It also speaks of something so far ignored by proposals: It speaks of the way in which defensive doctrines should be tackled -- of the mutual recognition of these doctrines. I think this need of the mutual recognition of doctrines is a crucial novelty insofar as disarmament proposals are concerned. Finally, the plan speaks of the need to take further action to increase security in the era of confidence. This should be taken to mean that further discussions can cover not only the issues of promoting military confidence, but also supra military means of confidence-building, which is also a most crucial element of discussion.

We should note that Jaruzelski's plan is not an attempt to shift danger from one European sub-region to other sub-regions. On the contrary, the plan has been submitted in the interest of all Europe. Why then does it apply first of all to central Europe? The answer is obvious: Central Europe is a region with an exceptional concentration of arms and armed forces and is an especially endangered region. That is why progress in central Europe would be of crucial significance for all Europe, as the plan states.

The plan also speaks of reduction in operational and tactical weapons, and in the appropriate kinds of conventional weapons. This means that weapons would not be shifted to other regions, but would be completely eliminated. [zredukowane]

Commentary in PRAVDA

PM111401 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 May 87 Second Edition p 6

[Yevgeniy Grigoryev commentary: "The 'Jaruzelski Plan'"]

[Text] On the eve of Victory Day Poland has erected one more milestone in the struggle for peace in Europe. Warsaw has advanced a comprehensive plan to reduce arms and strengthen confidence in Central Europe. It was made public by the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and chairman of the Polish Council of State and at once entered the contemporary international lexicon as the "Jaruzelski plan."

The idea of military detente on our continent is a constant in the Polish socialist state's foreign policy. In the past it inspired the "Rapacki plan." We also know of other Warsaw peace initiatives which have received international recognition.

The present Polish contribution assumes very great significance in terms of many parameters: in terms of the times, which demand of every country constructive efforts in favor of disarmament; in terms of the noble, humane aims underpinning the document that has been submitted; in terms of the novelty of the approach and the proposed actions; in terms of geography, because it involves gradually reducing nuclear and conventional arms in a region where the military-political alliances oppose each other in the most concentrated and dangerous way. In other words, It is a question of the key European section of the road to disarmament.

The comprehensive plan is not the sum of past proposals. European politics have been presented with an original document, the initial zone which it delineates, embracing Poland, the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary, as well as the FRG, the Benelux countries, and Denmark, differs from the territorial framework of the other military detente measures under discussion. It is proposed to shift the center of gravity in conventional arms primarily toward reducing those with the maximum force and accuracy which can serve for a surprise attack. The question of changing the nature of military doctrines so they can be mutually recognized as exclusively defensive is being placed on the agenda for the first time.

The "Jaruzelski plan" will undoubtedly be the subject of broad public and interstate discussion because it represents a substantial part of the all-European process. The Polish initiative gives a useful boost to its development, to the strengthening of confidence and the achievement of disarmament. The comprehensive plan is consonant with the idea of a nuclear-free Europe and helps to realize it. Once again we note with fraternal gratitude that Poland, with its solid political potential and prestige, is making its active contribution to achieving the aims of the socialist community countries' concerted policy.

In European and world politics it is easy to note how the fraternal states are increasing their activeness aimed at solving urgent problems and restructuring international relations in the spirit of the new political thinking. The Soviet Union has followed up the draft treaty on the problem of medium-range missiles by placing another draft on the negotiating table in Geneva. It proposes the coordination of "key provisions of agreements" on a number of major disarmament problems, including strategic offensive arms. The record of constructive steps aimed at eliminating the threat of war and nuclear and chemical means of warfare includes bold, farsighted proposals from the GDR, the CSSR, and other fraternal states.

But what of West Europe? Where is the NATO countries' corresponding disarmament constructiveness, instead of the very persistent efforts by certain circles to erect barriers in the way of a nuclear-free world? One would like to hope that this will come in the end and that reason will prevail.

Peace initiatives and consistent efforts to realize them attest to the socialist states' high responsibility in the struggle for mankind's survival, for security and cooperation in Europe, and for the nuclear-free world of which all peoples dream. An example of international conduct worthy of all possible emulation in our critical times.

TASS Cites PAP Report

LD082255 Moscow TASS in English 2233 GMT 8 May 87

[Text] Warsaw May 8 TASS--Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee and chairman of the Polish Council of State, came up with a new comprehensive plan for arms cuts and confidence building in central Europe. He was addressing the second congress of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth today, the PAP news agency reported.

The plan provides for a gradual reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons in a zone, including nine countries: the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, as well as the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Denmark.

The plan presupposes:

A gradual withdrawal of jointly agreed shorter range nuclear weapons,

A gradual withdrawal of jointly agreed conventional arms with the maximum destructive capability,

The evolution of the nature of military doctrine so that they could be mutually recognised as defensive,

The outlining of security and confidence-building measures that will go farther than those launched in Stockholm, as well as the use of effective national and international means of control, including broad observation and on-site inspection.

The plan is regarded as an integral part of the all-European process started in Helsinki, PAP stressed.

Foreign Ministry Press Briefing

LD121720 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1555 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Moscow, 12 May (TASS) -- The Soviet Union sees the new proposals of the PPR, which received the name "Jaruzelski Plan" as an important contribution to the joint efforts of socialist countries aimed at consolidating peace and security in Europe, stated Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He spoke here today at the briefing for newsmen.

This is a plan for reducing armaments and strengthening confidence in the central European zone on the territory of nine European states, although this number can be increased. According to the opinion of the Polish side, noted Gennadiy Gerasimov, this is both a plan and a program, the essence of which is the gradual withdrawal of jointly agreed types of operational and tactical nuclear weapons and conventional armaments, primarily those with the greatest strike capacity and accuracy, which could be used for a surprise attack. The plan envisages thorough verification and monitoring measures [mery proverki i kontrolya]. Along with this, the "Jaruzelski Plan" proposes to make the military doctrines of the two opposing blocs purely defensive.

The implementation of the new Polish initiative would, in our view, the representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed, assist in reducing the level of military confrontation on the European Continent, strengthening trust among the European countries, and advancing on the road to disarmament.

This proposal is also very important in the context of the development of pan-European process.

/8309

CSO: 5200/3008

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

NATO-WARSAW PACT 'UNOFFICIAL CONSULTATIONS' IN VIENNA CONTINUE

LD181508 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1335 GMT 18 May 87

[Text] Vienna, 18 May (TASS) -- A routine meeting was held today within the framework of the unofficial consultation of representatives of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact and of the NATO states, on matters of reducing the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

During the meeting, the principled approach of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries was again expounded, to the effect that only by way of substantial mutual reductions can the level of military confrontation on the continent be lowered, and stability at lower levels facilitated. The representatives of the Warsaw Pact countries pointed to the unacceptability of an approach that would be based on the "presumption of the military superiority" of the socialist countries, and would envisage the "evening out" of the correlation of armed forces without their reduction.

It was once again stressed that at future talks, the problem of tactical nuclear weapons as an important component in the potential of a sudden attack should be considered precisely in the context of reducing the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

The representatives of the socialist countries again stressed that matters of European disarmament are an integral part of the overall European process. They repeated their call to the countries of NATO to intensify consultations with the aim of moving on as soon as possible to the elaboration of a mandate for future talks, and to utilize various forms toward this, including the creation of editorial working groups.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1494

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER ARGUES NATO-WARSAW PACT PARITY EXISTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Borin]

[Text] The chief of the American delegation at the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, Max Kampelman, again took up the rather decrepit scarecrow of the "Soviet military threat." This time Soviet ground forces attracted his attention. The number of their personnel and quantity of modern tanks, stated Kampelman categorically, "already exceeds the corresponding indices of ground forces of the United States almost four times over." It is not difficult to guess toward what Kampelman and the authors of other such statements, which resound here and there in the West, are striving. Relying on their unsubstantiated assertions, they draw this conclusion: The U. S. and NATO must "carry out a spurt" in building up conventional weapons, and make up for their certain "inadequacy."

The purpose of such "conclusions," which are extremely dangerous to the cause of peace and international security, are obvious. First, the enemies of detente are striving to brush aside the proposal made in Budapest by the Warsaw Treaty Organization member states for a comprehensive and balanced program for reducing armed forces and conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals. Second, they are attempting to justify the desire of the American, and not only the American, leaders to retain in Europe, no matter what, the 355,000 man grouping of U. S. armed forces, and prevent a reduction in their numbers.

In the opinion of Washington and some of its West European allies, for this all means are good means; even open slander and disinformation, based on special "Washington arithmetic." In its so-called "calculations," the West deliberately does not take into account either mobilization and human resources, or reserve formations, or depot supplies of NATO weapons and equipment. Shamelessly padding the data on the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, they reduce in every way their own parameters. They exclude from calculating on the NATO side the armed forces of France and Spain, as well as those armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc states which are subordinate to national commands.

Approximate parity exists between the Warsaw Treaty states and NATO. And this is not only true with respect to nuclear, but also conventional types of arms. Many Western specialists acknowledge this. For example, Paul Nitze, special advisor to the U. S. secretary of state for arms control matters, believes that the number of personnel in the armed forces is not an area where the Soviet Union or the other Warsaw Treaty Organization countries has superiority. The number of military personnel in the NATO countries, Nitze indicates, is approximately the same as on the side of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Moreover, "the correlation of conventional forces between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO is not only close to parity, but is even to the advantage of the West." This conclusion was drawn in 1986 by the Brookings Institute, which is very authoritative in the U. S. And U. S. Secretary of State George Schultz, soon after the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik expressed himself more definitively: "In the index of gross national product the West is almost three times the size of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries... in population it consists of approximately 560 million people in the U. S. and Western Europe, plus 120 million Japanese. The population of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe is approximately 390 million. Thus, we have population size and resources which are frightening... Therefore, when people say that in a nuclear-free world we will be surpassed in general purpose forces, I simply don't believe this."

Seemingly, this is highly convincing. But professional anti-Soviets are not pacified. They tirelessly invent more and more "arguments" to discredit the idea of turning Europe finally into a "continent without weapons." One of the latest "innovations" belongs to the U. S. secretary of defense, who says that the peace initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member states do not suit the West for "economic considerations." According to calculations which Weinberger made, the transportation costs to return every 100,000 American servicemen and women and their military equipment to the continental United States would be \$500 million. Moreover, grieves the Pentagon chief, construction or repair of the existing barracks on U. S. territory for "the American contingent returned from Europe" would cost \$4.7 billion.

All of these millions and billions undoubtedly may stagger the imagination of the residents in the West. But, the proposals formulated at the Budapest Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member states in June 1986 in no way presume to put anyone to "expenses." This is even more true with respect to the "maintenance and quartering of troops and storing of their weapons." There is reason to recall again that the proposal to reduce more than half a million personnel and 25 percent of the tactical strike aviation in Europe, both on the side of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and that of NATO, presumes that all states participating in the proposed agreement will pledge not to increase their ground forces and tactical strike aviation beyond the boundaries of the zone of reduction. It is proposed that the reduced components of armed forces will be disbanded by integrated military large units, units and subunits, along with their organic weapons and military equipment. Their personnel would be subject to be demobilized according to the procedure established in the state. Some types of military equipment, upon agreement, could be transferred for use for peaceful purposes. Nuclear warheads would mandatorily be destroyed.

But this path to disarmament in Europe does not suit the NATO countries, and most especially the U. S. Yes, and judging by everything, they do not need detente either. And so they resort to such "arithmetic," in which two times two far from always equals four.

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CSO: 5200/1443

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

AUSTRIAN DAILY INTERVIEWS SOVIET GENERAL ON CONVENTION BALANCE

AU140835 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 13 May 87 p 3

[Erich Feichtinger report on interview with Major General Professor Doctor Simonyan: "Interview With a Soviet Military Scientist: the Conventional Fears of the Europeans"--given "last week"; place unspecified]

[Excerpt] Parity Exists

We asked Soviet military scientist Major General Professor Doctor Simonyan about how he sees the power balance in the conventional arms sector.

He upholds the view that in the conventional arms sector "an approximate equilibrium exists between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Naturally there is no complete symmetry, this is also practically impossible, but a parity exists."

On the basis of historical development, the Major General continues, there are more of some types of weapons in the countries of the Warsaw Pact and more of others in the NATO countries. But after a comprehensive count of the military potential one arrives at the conclusion that there is an approximate parity. Western sources also confirm this.

Actually the Warsaw Pact possesses some more tanks, the major general admits, but NATO possesses--many times over--more antitank weapons.

With respect to troop strength the military scientist points out: "The number of combat-ready NATO divisions is greater. The relationship here is 94 to 78. In addition, a U.S. division is 16,000 to 19,000 men strong; a Bundeswehr division 24,000 men strong, whereas the divisions of the Warsaw Pact armies have a maximum of 11,000 to 12,000 men." With respect to mobilization reserves the fact must be taken into consideration that the population of the NATO countries is 1.5 times larger than that of the Warsaw Pact member states.

"As far as the tactical air force is concerned, "the major general recounts, "the relationship is also in NATO's favor."

It is true that the Warsaw Pact possesses a greater number of interceptors--something that shows its defensive orientation--but NATO has a 1.2 to 1 advantage in fighter bombers, and 1.8 to 1 in helicopters.

According to its own reports NATO is clearly superior in naval forces.

"Hence, there will be no advantages for the Warsaw Pact after the elimination of nuclear weapons," Simonyan concludes.

A view which, as it were, even George Shultz shared in an interview with journalists of the NEW YORK TIMES on 15 October 1986.

To the question "Whether or not the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe would enhance the conventional or nonnuclear superiority of the Soviet Union on the continent," the U.S. secretary of state replied that he thought "that the conventional armed forces of the United States and of its allies could well cope with this situation."

Why, then, these fears about nuclear disarmament? Simonyan: "The tittle-tattle about the so-called overwhelming superiority of the Warsaw Pact constitutes an attempt to hide their own unwillingness to solve the nuclear disarmament problem."

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: HISTORY, ACHIEVEMENTS OF CD SURVEYED

Kiev RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Mar 87 p 3

[Article by A. Kotlyarenko: "Successes and Hopes"]

[Text] It is a rare day that passes in which the name of this Swiss city does not appear in the kaleidoscope of events taking place on the planet. Spread out cozily on the bank of an amazingly beautiful lake, surrounded by spurs of the Alps, Geneva has long already become a place for conducting diplomatic negotiations and a center where many international organizations have been located.

In one of the huge parks, where on neatly mowed lawns grow age old Lebanon cedars and strut regal peacocks, towers the snow white Palace of Nations. This grand building was intended for the ignominiously ended League of Nations and all the way up to the post war years, in the graphic expression of journalists, recalled "sleeping beauty." Today the Palace of Nations looks more like an awakened beehive. From morning until late in the evening, and frequently even through the night, sharp discussions go on in numerous halls on urgent international problems at sessions of various conferences, commissions and committees.

On the second floor of the right wing of the palace is the Spanish hall, over the entrance to which are carved the somber words: "Mankind must disarm or perish." This terse but very weighty thought has acquired particular topicality today, in the age of nuclear missile weapons. Each new stone in the pyramid of weapons makes it ever more shaky, threatening to rain down on the heads of the peoples already stockpiled bombs, missiles and rounds.

A quarter century ago, on 14 March 1962, the 18 nation Disarmament Committee began to function in the Spanish hall of the Palace of Nations. It was established at the initiative of the USSR and the U. S., and the 16th Session of the UN General Assembly approved this proposal. Initially 18 countries joined the committee, with equal numbers of developed capitalist and socialist states, as well as broad representation of the non-aligned countries. In subsequent years the composition of the committee was repeatedly expanded, and today it includes 40 states, with the same principle observed. In 1984 the committee was renamed the Disarmament Conference. The committee became one of the first international organs operating on the basis of the principle of

consensus, when decisions are made not by voting, but by the achievement of unanimous agreement during negotiations.

The UN General Assembly assigned the committee a definite goal: achieve "agreement on universal and total disarmament under effective international control." The Soviet delegation did not come to Geneva with an empty portfolio. On 15 March; i.e., the second day following the ceremonial opening of the committee, it introduced a draft treaty on universal and total disarmament. This draft was based on a thoroughly thought out system of measures, the implementation of which in the period outlined (four years) would lead to the elimination of armies, weapons and the military machine of all states.

The American delegation, having arrived in Geneva, as we say, with empty arms, found itself in a very uncomfortable position. More than 700 journalists who arrived at the open committee literally tormented the American representatives with one and the same question: Why did the U. S. not bring any specific proposals, does Washington want disarmament? In the U. S. Department of State they hastily set about to write a document to cover the emptiness of their position, as with a fig leaf. Only a month later did the Americans present a document, which even they did not resolve to call a draft treaty, but entitled an "Outline of the Main Provisions of a Treaty."

The Soviet proposal was fervently supported by the majority of delegations in the committee. And not only by them. Numerous delegations -- women from Canada, the U. S. and France, working youth from the FRG, peasants from Italy -- visited Geneva in those already historic days. They brought petitions, missives, and letters approved at massed gatherings and meetings, which contained appeals to the committee to take energetic steps to halt the arms race. A meeting of the Soviet delegation with a group of French war veterans who had suffered through the horrors of Fascist death camps was especially stirring. In the petition they wrote: "In the names of millions of people lying in fraternal graves on the fields of battle against Fascism, we earnestly request that you do everything possible and impossible, so that this will never again be repeated." The veterans attempted to submit a similar petition to the American delegation, but the representatives of Washington did not wish even to meet with them. Is there any reason to be surprised that literally from the first sessions negotiations on disarmament were sidetracked from the main objectives?

Numerous critical remarks were made to the committee, many of which were justified. They were based on the desire to see concrete results. This desire is understandable. But, at the same time one should not forget that, on the one hand, the work of the committee takes place in a difficult international environment, and on the other hand, the problem of disarmament is extremely complex, it touches not only military and political interests of the states, but also their economic, ideological and many other interests. Many years of experience in negotiations have shown that under modern conditions, in parallel with negotiations on universal disarmament, it is necessary to seek ways to solve partial issues of limiting the arms race. Acting in this manner, the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist

community, with the active support of the developing states, achieved the acceptance in the committee of specific effective disarmament measures.

It is precisely here, at the table of diplomatic negotiations in the committee, that the idea of a partial halt to nuclear testing was born and many of the sharp angles of contradictions were erased. August 5, 1963 went down in history as the day when the first step was made on the difficult and long path of disarmament. A treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, space and under water was signed in Moscow. More than 120 states, including the Ukrainian SSR, signed this historic document. Today five powers possess nuclear weapons, but this does not mean that other states may not also enter the "atomic club", as for many years their production has held no secret. More than 30 states have sufficient scientific and technical capability and an economic base to create their own nuclear weapons in a short period of time. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the text of which was coordinated in the Disarmament Committee, stood as a reliable barrier to the spread of this weapon about the planet. The treaty went into force in March 1970.

The surface of the world's oceans occupy two thirds of the planet. The imperialists intend to use that surface for the deployment of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction. Back in the 1960s the USSR attracted the attention of world public opinion to this danger, and after a struggle lasting many years in the specially created organ, where the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR also played a very active role, the committee on disarmament succeeded in preparing a draft treaty banning the deployment of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction on sea and ocean beds and in their depths. The treaty went into effect in May 1972, and our republic also signed this document.

It is difficult to exaggerate the contribution of the committee to the important and intense work of coordinating the text of the convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of reserves of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons, and about their destruction, which entered force in 1975. The Ukrainian SSR is also a participant in this convention, which represents essentially the first measure of real and actual disarmament in the history of international relations. One of the most dangerous types of weapons of mass destruction has been removed from the military arsenals and destroyed.

With the use of means developed in laboratories already today such ungovernable forces of nature as earthquakes, tidal waves and floods can be put into effect. Good sense demands that these weapons not be allowed to enter the inventories of armies, when it will be much more difficult to ban them. At the initiative of the Soviet Union, the Disarmament Committee studied this problem and prepared a draft convention banning military or any other hostile use of means of affecting the environment. The convention became an active international document in October 1978.

Such are the most important successes of the 25 years of work of the Disarmament Committee. Are there hopes for the achievement of new coordinated measures in the field of disarmament? Yes there are. On the agenda of the

committee are numerous extremely important questions, about which negotiations have already proceeded a large part of the way. For example, the banning of chemical and nuclear weapons, creation of nuclear free zones, banning of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, complete cessation of nuclear tests and a number of other issues can be named.

Our country is truly striving to solve the most important problem facing mankind, the problem of survival. This was confirmed for the "umpteenth" time in the 28 February proposal by M. S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, on intermediate range missiles, which gives mankind a real chance to strengthen security on the planet. The major new initiative of our country will also be discussed in Geneva, at the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons.

One of the great scientists of our day stated that the luminescent substance of uranium enabled mankind to kindle the nuclear fire. We should add: mankind must do everything possible and impossible in order to see that he is not burned up in the flames of this fire.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

POLAND'S ORZECZOWSKI ADDRESSES CSCE MEETING--Vienna, May 12 TASS--Favourable conditions have been recently created for a cut in the level of military confrontation in Europe, and real prospects are opening for freeing the continent from medium and shorter range missiles, a cut in the forces and conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals. A statement to this effect was made at the plenary session of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states--participants in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation today by Marian Orzechowski, member of the Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, Polish foreign minister. He pointed out in that connection that the specific plan proposed by Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, chairman of the Polish Council of State, provides for a broad spectrum of measures directed at a cut in arms and building up confidence in Central Europe. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1923 GMT 12 May 87] /8309

CSO: 5200/3008

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW BLAMES RADIATION INCREASE ON U.S. TESTS

LD091847 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 9 May 87

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] In the last few months scientists have registered more than once the enhanced radiation level in the earth's atmosphere. They give different explanations to that, some even claim that the enhanced radiation level was the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident that took place one year ago. But the checking done by experts of various countries proved that Chernobyl had nothing to do with that. No serious accidents were registered at nuclear power plants in other countries either, but radioactive flares were still observed in the atmosphere. Soviet experts studied atmospheric aerosol samples taken in the period from the 20th to the 25th of February. As it turned out, they contained radioactive isotopes which can appear in the atmosphere only as a result of nuclear explosions. As is known, the Soviet Union held no such explosions in that period, adhering to its unilaterally declared moratorium.

As for the United States, it exploded its nuclear devices in Nevada on 3rd and 11th February, so it's these blasts that became a source of radioactive emissions into the atmosphere. And the same was repeated on 18th March.

Now what do these facts show? First of all they show that underground nuclear explosions can also be harmful to the environment. And secondly, there is a justified doubt that the United States strictly adhered to the commitments of the Moscow treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. Incidentally, in the past the Soviet Union drew attention of the American side to that on many occasions.

In his latest statement, the official spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry reaffirmed that the Soviet Union is ready to solve in a radical way the problem of nuclear tests, that is to ban such tests. The attainment of this will not only put a barrier in the way of the nuclear arms race, but will also exclude the possibility of a dangerous radioactive contamination of the atmosphere as a result of nuclear explosions.

The United States' response to this, however, was the following: a total ban on nuclear testing is not the first priority task for the United States. That was stated by the director of the American arms control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman. The United States' stubborn unwillingness to agree to the halting of nuclear tests carried out with the aim of perfecting new kinds of nuclear weapons, including those developed within the Star Wars program, blocks any progress on this major direction of the arms race containment effort. So American nuclear blasts poison not only the terrestrial but the political atmosphere as well.

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CSO: 5200/1491

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

NEW ROUND OF SOVIET-U.S. TALKS--Geneva, 18 May (TASS)--A new round of Soviet-U.S. talks between experts on issues relating to halting nuclear tests begins here today. Previous rounds have shown that the U.S. side is not committed as yet to achieving an accord on beginning full-scale talks on completely banning nuclear tests. The USSR delegation is headed by Andronik Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy.

[Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2010 GMT 17 May 87]
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CSO: 5200/1491

RELATED ISSUES

MEXICAN FOREIGN SECRETARY DISCUSSES ARMS ISSUES IN MOSCOW

Meets With Gromyko

LD041514 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1415 GMT 4 May 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 4 May (TASS)--Andrey Gromyko, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, received today in the Kremlin Bernardo Sepulveda Amor, secretary of foreign relations of the United Mexican States, who is in the Soviet Union for an official visit.

Problems connected with contributions by both states to the cause of strengthening peace and bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Mexico were the key topics of conversation.

From the Soviet side a high degree of appreciation was voiced for Mexico's efforts, along with the other countries of the "Delhi Six" -- Argentina, Greece, India, Tanzania, and Sweden -- in advocating the elimination of the nuclear threat and opposing the spread of the arms race into space. Each meeting of the leaders of the "Delhi Six" countries forms a new step in mankind's struggle against the nuclear threat and leaves its mark on modern history. It need not be doubted that the next meeting, scheduled for June this year in Stockholm, will do likewise.

Mexico has also been making noble efforts, along with other participants in the Contadora process, to achieve a just political settlement in Central America. Specifically, this concerns Nicaragua. The people of Nicaragua, indeed all the peoples of the area, are thirsting for peace, and reject the claims of any state or group of states that views the countries of Central American as their own back yard.

A.A. Gromyko took pleasure in noting Mexico's growing role in world affairs. The Soviet Union has always favored Latin American countries expressing their weighty word in favor of peace, and continues to do so. Soviet people wish them only successes in this regard, and offer them the hand of friendship.

B. Sepulveda, on behalf of the Mexican Government, positively assessed the Soviet peace initiatives expounded in the statements by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, evaluating the Soviet Union's approach to international affairs as innovative and effective.

Present at the conversation were, on the Soviet side, V.G. Komplektov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, and R.A. Sergeyev, USSR ambassador in Mexico; and on the Mexican side, Horacio Flores de la Pena, Mexico's ambassador in the USSR.

Views Issues With Shevardnadze

LD051807 Moscow TASS in English 1648 GMT 5 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS -- Talks began in Moscow today between Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and Bernardo Sepulveda, Mexican minister of foreign affairs, who had arrived in the Soviet Union for an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Topical issues of our time were discussed in a friendly atmosphere.

It was pointed out that the Soviet Union and Mexico, adhering to identical or close positions on the most important international issues, consistently come out in favour of strengthening peace, curbing the nuclear arms race, and achieving disarmament and just political solutions to crisis situations, and are for strict observance of the universally recognised norms of international law.

When informing Bernardo Sepulveda of the in-depth reorganisation which has got under way in all spheres of life in the Soviet Union and of the work aimed at accelerating the country's socio-economic development, Eduard Shevardnadze drew his attention to the objective connection between the upgrading of socialist society and the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

Eduard Shevardnadze explained in detail the Soviet concept of a nuclear-free world and of the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security, and emphasised that complete elimination of nuclear arsenals under the conditions of non-militarised outer space would become a stable foundation for a radical improvement of the situation in the world.

He specially touched upon the new Soviet initiative concerning the elimination of all medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe.

Bernardo Sepulveda pointed out that the Soviet Union's specific realistic proposals aimed at removing the nuclear threat, and the USSR's practical actions in this direction were welcomed by Mexico and were consonant with its stand and with the objectives of the six countries' initiative in favour of peace and disarmament, with Mexico playing an active role among them.

The sides emphasised that ensuring a guaranteed peace requires joint efforts of all those who are interested in the preservation of human civilisation.

People should get rid of all types of weapons of mass destruction, of which nuclear ones are the most barbarous, within a historically short period of time.

The untenability and unacceptability of the notorious nuclear deterrence concept and its particular danger were pointed out.

The two foreign ministers specially pointed out the need for absolute observance of all the existing international agreements which limit the arms race, and for action in favour of reaching new effective accords on that score, and declared for the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The Soviet side gave a high appraisal of Mexico's activities in the international arena and of its contribution to the cause of reducing international tension and giving greater scope to efforts for nuclear disarmament.

The talks which were held in a constructive and frank [Moscow TASS Russian version reads otkrovennoy] atmosphere will be continued.

Luncheon Speeches Reported

PM081135 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Soviet-Mexican Talks"]

[Excerpts] On 5 May, E.A. Shevardnadze held a luncheon in honor of B. Sepulveda. Attending the luncheon on the Soviet side were A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and other officials; and on the Mexican side--Mexican Ambassador to the USSR O. Flores de la Pena and the officials accompanying the foreign minister.

E.A. Shevardnadze addressed the guest, saying:

I am happy to welcome you to Moscow. The Soviet Union and Mexico are intensively continuing their important political dialogue, permeated with mutual respect and sympathy.

We have been pleased to establish today that the Soviet Union and Mexico continue to firmly champion current goals and central tasks mentioned in the personal messages exchanged by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev and Mexican President Mr Miguel de la Madrid.

I recall, Mr Minister, what you said last year in Mexico City to the effect that the nuclear age has brought into sharp focus the question of universal security, and therefore actions against the nuclear threat must also be universal and the responsibility should be collective.

These words were uttered in the historic Tlatelolco Hall, which gave its name to the treaty proclaiming Latin America a nuclear-free zone. In applauding your words at that time, we were applauding the decision by Mexico and its friends to remove their continent from the nuclear atlas.

Recently, we similarly welcomed and supported the Rarotonga Treaty, which covers a very large expanse of the South Pacific.

These and similar acts adopted or contemplated in other parts of the world fully accord with our political philosophy and our concept of the establishment of an all-embracing system of international security, to whose implementation, we hope, Mexican diplomats will make a considerable contribution with their typically bold and innovative approach.

Thus, whereas until recently the actual democratization of international life was the vital problem of the times, the democratic world community, by a vast majority of votes, is now tackling the question of a nuclear-free future in a practical way. And Mexico's activity -- individually and as one of the six Contadora Group states and as a member of the Nonaligned Movement -- has done much to promote this.

However, as long as nuclear weapons remain in just one or a few places, if their buildup, testing, and refinement continues, all these decisions can only reduce the threat of a catastrophe, not eliminate it altogether.

That is why the Soviet Union is proposing the solution of key problems for the European Continent -- medium-range and operational and tactical missiles.

I think we are both equally affected badly by the change of behavior and radical modification of the thinking of certain European politicians. First they urged and requested the removal of missiles from the continent, then their pronouncements became rather vague, and finally they announced that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence was the only foundation for peace and security.

This sounds blasphemous to us. Isn't this love of nuclear weapons, this dedication to them an expression of disrespect for the other peoples and disregard of their legitimate interests and aspirations? After all, the outbreak of war is not the only threat posed by the arms race. In fact, there exists the equally serious problem of international economic security, which, we believe, should be tackled on the basis of the integral concept of restructuring economic relations among states on a just and democratic basis.

The formula of the great Mexican Benito Juarez is indeed wise and entirely pertinent: "Peace means respect for others' rights." That statement, uttered more than 100 years ago, is more topical than ever today, when provocative contempt for the rights of other is destroying peace in entire regions, when regional conflicts, artificially maintained in imperial and neoglobalist interests, turn into tragedy for the lives of others.

This is why we are stressing our closeness to Mexico's foreign policy tradition, manifested on an extensive scale in moral support for the victims of oppression and aggression.

B. Sepulveda replied as follows:

During this third official Mexican foreign ministerial visit to the Soviet Union it has been source of great satisfaction that you and I, Mr Shevardnadze, have been able to resume our useful dialogue. I am convinced that this meeting will contribute to the development of the splendid, long-standard diplomatic relations between our countries.

Despite our different political and economic systems we have often held similar positions at international forums. And when our views on particular international issues or situations have not coincided, because of different national interests or approaches to world affairs, mutual respect has always been the dominant feature.

We in Mexico have followed with interest the initiatives by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, which reflect the will of your union of republics to carry out transformations in the name of progress and to strengthen and improve the structures, mechanisms, and methods in order to accelerate comprehensive development. We wish you success in the solution of this task.

The unjust structure of international economic relations aggravates inequality, denies opportunities, and dooms many countries to hopeless poverty. All this can lead to chaos and violence. So such countries as the Soviet Union and Mexico must seek to establish a new international economic order that will increase equal opportunities for all.

Moreover, there are problems associated with safeguarding peace and universal security in the world that affect all countries equally, regardless of ideology and political system. They include nuclear disarmament, conservation of natural resources and of the environment as a whole, the peaceful use of space, the rational utilization of marine resources, the technological revolution, and the proper use of this new knowledge by all the peoples.

The struggle for peace undoubtedly represents the foundation for the fusion of our approaches in bilateral dialogue. We in Mexico acknowledge the need to revive expectations of detente and mutual understanding that appeared as a result of the Helsinki conference and were lost after the desire for superiority and confrontation predominated. A great effort is now needed to ensure that the hopes generated by the process started in Reykjavik are not disappointed.

The Mexican Government is following with special attention the various proposals by the Soviet Union aimed at activating talks in the disarmament sphere. It believes that these initiatives will promote the reduction and elimination of operational and tactical missiles and medium-range missiles and other types of mass destruction weapons as well. This could pave the way to the holding of conventional arms talks, which are to essential.

Mexico is traditionally associated with initiatives contributing to disarmament. It is currently a member of a group that brings together the state and government heads of the six countries that put forward a number of proposals on banning nuclear tests, reducing strategic arsenals, and on preventing the arms race from spreading to space.

The Mexican Government expects the initiatives put forward by a number of European states, inspired by the example of the Tlatelolco Treaty, to create new nuclear-free zones to be promoted. We value the support the Soviet Union could give to these efforts.

The belief should also be upheld that peace is a thing of value that everyone must protect. The erroneous notions that the problems of peace and international stability are the exclusive domain of the great powers are a thing of the past. But it would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States, as the largest nuclear powers, bear the historical responsibility and by dint of this have the largest political and moral obligations. That is why Mexico resolutely adds its voice to the international community's appeal that both powers achieve progress at their talks, displaying a steadfast will on the path to disarmament.

The speaker noted the importance of utilizing, in the spirit of the new thinking, the enormous forces of civilization in the interests of peace. Dwelling on Latin American problems, he talked about the importance of efforts by the Contadora and Support Groups for the effective solution of the conflict in Central America in line with the legitimate interests of all sides and in the spirit of justice.

Joint Communiqué Issued

PM081229 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 87 Second Edition p 4

["Joint Soviet-Mexican Communiqué"]

[Excerpts] Bernardo Sepulveda Amor, foreign minister of the United Mexican States, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union 4-8 May at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

The Mexican foreign minister was received by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

B. Sepulveda was also received by A.A. Gromyko, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium member.

Talks took place between E.A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR foreign minister, and B. Sepulveda, and the Mexican minister also had a conversation with V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The talks between the foreign ministers took place in a friendly, cordial atmosphere, in a spirit of mutual understanding. The ministers stressed that this new meeting attests to the high level of relations between the USSR and Mexico. The sides agreed to continue their efforts aimed at strengthening these relations and at promoting the development and expansion of the two countries' cooperation on the basis of the principles of mutual advantage, peaceful coexistence, legal equality of states, mutual respect, free self-determination, and noninterference in internal affairs.

The ministers confirmed the coincidence or proximity of both countries' positions on the most important questions of the international situation. They expressed the deep concern of their governments in connection with the serious threat to mankind which is presented by the continuation and buildup of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and by the danger of its spreading into space.

The participants in the talks declared that the realities of the modern world demand new approaches to the solution of international problems on the basis of the settlement of conflicts exclusively by peaceful means, the renunciation of the use of military force or the threat of its use, the exclusion of confrontation and hostility, and the building of confidence.

The ministers stressed that now it is impermissible to build a strategy of ensuring peace upon nuclear weapons -- this contradicts the experience and the very nature of civilization. The concept of nuclear deterrence is dangerous in itself and runs counter to the logic of the humanistic philosophy of peace and development. Adherence to the principles of building a nuclear-free and nonviolent world was expressed on both sides.

Both sides are convinced that the only reliable way to avert war -- nuclear war above all -- is the coordination and practical implementation of real measures aimed at the total liquidation of all types of weapons of mass destruction.

E.A. Shevardnadze explained the specific foreign policy program of the Soviet Union which is embodied in a more generalized form in the proposal for the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

In this connection B. Sepulveda declared that the Mexican Government evaluates extremely positively this proposal for the strengthening of international peace and security which is an important contribution to the development of a productive, confrontation-free dialogue between all UN member states in the interests of improving the international atmosphere and establishing cooperation in all spheres of international relations. The participants in the talks came out in favor of holding a broad dialogue among states with the purpose of enriching the specific content of this proposal.

The USSR foreign minister dwelt in detail on the content of a major new initiative of the Soviet Union on the problem of medium-range missiles, showing that it is aimed at the elimination both of this class of armaments and also of operational and tactical missiles in Europe and opens up real opportunities for the signing of an agreement in the very near future. The ministers advocated the need for the speediest conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. treaty on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. They expressed their governments' confidence that progress in this sphere will have a favorable impact on other avenues of talks on questions of disarmament, including talks on strategic and space weapons.

The participants emphasized the imperative need to reach a Soviet-U.S. accord on the radical reduction of strategic offensive arms and the prevention of an arms race in space. They believe that observance of the ABM Treaty must be the very first step in this direction. Both ministers agree that space must be an arena not of military rivalry but of broad international cooperation for peaceful purposes.

The Soviet Union and Mexico advocate the immediate ending of all nuclear weapon tests and the speediest drafting and signing of a multilateral treaty on their complete and definitive prohibition with efficient international verification, including with the use of the proposals of the six states which advanced the initiative in favor of peace and disarmament.

Both ministers again advocated the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and also supported the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world. In this connection they confirmed their determination to strengthen the regime of the treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty).

Both sides noted the importance of supplementing efforts toward nuclear disarmament with specific measures to reduce conventional arms. The ministers advocated the speediest conclusion of an international convention banning chemical weapons. B. Sepulveda considers the decision recently adopted by the Soviet Union to cease production of chemical weapons and to begin constructing in the USSR of a special enterprise to destroy them to be a positive step in this direction.

The sides again confirmed that it is necessary to galvanize the activities of all forums and talks among states on questions of disarmament so as to make real progress there with the help of a new, dynamic approach.

E.A. Shevardnadze highly evaluated the vigorous activity of Mexico and the other countries in the Group of Six in the disarmament sphere, which makes a significant contribution to the cause of strengthening international peace and security. He voiced the hope that "the six" will continue their efforts with a view to eliminating the nuclear threat.

Both sides noted with satisfaction the Latin American countries' growing role in world affairs and their constructive contribution to preserving and strengthening peace and to the efforts to curb the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, and to strengthen international law and order and confidence and cooperation among states.

When examining regional conflicts, the ministers voiced concern at their continuation and exacerbation, which have a negative effect on the world situation. They confirmed their countries' readiness to promote the search for political solutions to these conflicts acceptable to all sides on the basis of the universally recognized norms of international law.

B. Sepulveda pointed to the urgent need for more active support for initiatives for a peaceful settlement in Central America on the part of the international community. He declared that external interference, the growing foreign military presence, and the militarization of the region are undermining regional security, as well as the process of the strengthening of political institutions and the peaceful development of the countries of that region. B. Sepulveda pointed out that any way to settle the conflict must be based on respect for the principles of noninterference, coexistence, and the peoples' right to free self-determination, on the prohibition of the threat or use of force, and on abandonment of the policy of pressuring sovereign states by means of a show of military force.

E.A. Shevardnadze highly evaluated Mexico's constructive role in the Contadora Group's activity and confirmed the Soviet Union's support for the efforts of Contadora and other Latin American countries in the search for a Latin American solution to the conflict in Central America. The USSR is ready to help to ease tension and create favorable conditions for a just political settlement in that region.

Social emphasis was placed on the close connection between disarmament and development. The sides attach great significance to the upcoming UN international conference on this problem, which could, in particular, tackle the elaboration of specific mechanisms for switching to development purposes part of the funds that will be released as disarmament proceeds.

Both sides advocate that the Pacific region not be turned into a source of tension and an arena of military-political confrontation but become a region of lasting peace and security, in which relations of goodwill and cooperation would be developed. The ministers supported the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and urge all nuclear powers to guarantee its status unilaterally or multilaterally. In this connection the Mexican side noted with satisfaction the Soviet Union's signing of the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1495

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA ON MOVE TO 'NEW THINKING' IN SECURITY ISSUES

PM141355 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 87 First Edition p 4

[Article by PRAVDA political observer Yuriy Zhukov: "It Is Time To Learn To Listen To and Understand Each Other"]

[Text] As time goes on Soviet foreign policy, which is based on the new thinking corresponding to the realities of the nuclear missile age, is evoking an increasingly strong response throughout the world. When our 27th party congress proclaimed the concept of an interconnected, interdependent, even if contradictory, yet in many respects integral human society, many Sovietologists aspiring to the role of latter-day prophets said, smiling wryly and skeptically shaking their heads: Propaganda!

However, our party and state have followed this up with a whole series of well thought-out, consistent, and purposeful steps. And as time passes, it is becoming more and more difficult for our enemies to respond to each new constructive step taken by Soviet diplomacy with the hackneyed cry of propaganda, propaganda, propaganda!...

We are aware that ahead of us still lies a long and hard struggle to achieve a radical breakthrough in international relations and the acceptance by all states belonging to opposed political systems of the new thinking, which rules out wars as a way of states influencing other states by means of force.

What are the reasons for our confidence in the ultimate success of the policy based on the new thinking?

As M.S. Gorbachev noted in his speech in the Kremlin 24 April, the new political thinking and the ensuing new foreign policy practice are based on a realistic analysis of the present-day world, which has changed greatly in recent times. The world now looks like a community of states with a different history, different traditions and customs, and different political, economic, and social systems. Every nation has its aspirations. Every state has its national interests. But despite all this they are equally interested in their survival, which can be ensured only if another world war can be avoided.

There are profound contradictions between us and capitalism, of course. And, of course, the inexorable laws of the class struggle continue to apply in today's world. Rivalry between the two opposed social systems is inevitable. However, the humane socialist system is magnanimously proposing to its opponent -- the capitalist system -- the exclusion of the military component that is fraught with universal annihilation from this rivalry once and for all. It is proposing peaceful competition in the economy, science, technology, education, and health care, in all spheres, in short, with the exception of the arms race. Let each nation decide its destiny itself and make the choice between the competing systems!

Mankind's security on the threshold of the 21st century is indivisible. Guided by this incontrovertible truth, our party has put forward its program of struggle for mankind's survival which is based on the principle that you cannot build your own security at the expense of the security of others. Security encompasses all the main spheres of international relations -- political, economic, and humanitarian.

The implementation of the program put forward by the 27th congress of our party is called upon to advance civilization to a qualitatively new level. [paragraph continues]

Profoundly convinced that this is a realistic task, the Soviet leadership is developing its peace offensive on an increasingly broad scale.

The Kremlin has firmly captured the initiative and as time passes it is becoming increasingly difficult for our partners in talks to justify the "No" with which they have replied so often and are still replying to the Soviet Union's proposals. Personal meetings between our leadership and the leaders of foreign countries are playing a tremendous role in this active and militant struggle.

In the course of meetings with the fraternal socialist countries' leaders our community's purposeful initiatives are coordinated, new ideas are developed, and new, far-reaching collective ventures are proposed.

Meetings with leaders of developing and nonaligned states make it possible to considerably expand the front of the peace offensive and to mutually enrich our philosophical concepts of the present and the future, which closely resemble each other. The most vivid example of this was the Delhi declaration signed as a result of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and Prime Minister R. Gandhi of India.

Meetings with leaders of capitalist states which take place in an atmosphere of direct and impartial dialogue are marked by lively, and as a rule fruitful, exchanges of views and a quest for possible, mutually acceptable solutions clarifying what can be achieved at a given stage and what will have to be fought out in the future.

Talks in the Kremlin with parliamentary delegations and public figures proceed along the same lines. A dialogue aimed at humanizing interstate relations is being developed and deepened.

In our time it is more important than ever before to learn to listen to and understand each other. The Soviet side is ready for this. Let there be arguments and polemics if, ultimately, the dialogue makes it possible for its participants to clarify each other's positions and intentions, thus clearing the path toward mutual understanding and subsequent adoption of mutually acceptable solutions.

Let us recall the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva in November 1985. There were many arguments. However, in the end a mutual pledge was adopted by the USSR and the United States "to prevent an arms race in space and to end it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms, and to consolidate strategic stability."

Let us recall the meeting in Reykjavik in October 1986. There too there were many arguments and furthermore it proved impossible to reach agreement on the key issue of the nonmilitarization of space. Nonetheless, on the basis of Soviet proposals, far-reaching accords were achieved in Reykjavik which pave the way to substantial reductions and even the elimination of nuclear arms. The groundwork for the solution of these problems was laid in Reykjavik.

It is not easy to conduct talks on such key issues with our U.S. partners. Washington is constantly backpedaling on existing accords, putting forward new conditions and reservations, and using the talks purely for propaganda purposes. Nonetheless, the persistent and consistent peace initiative of the Soviet side is bearing fruit. A vivid demonstration of this is the progress achieved at the talks on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. The recent Soviet proposals for the elimination of not just medium-range but also operational and tactical missiles have deprived disarmament's opponents of their last trump cards.

Angrily they have spoken out against the elimination of our operational and tactical missiles and demanded that instead the USSR agree to "upgrading" their own missiles in this class. This "topsy-turvy logic" has naturally evoked protests from sober-minded people in West Europe.

Despite all the propaganda tricks to which U.S. politicians and generals resort, the new thinking is gradually winning over the minds of people and ousting the old way of thinking.

This is graphically demonstrated by the utterances of prominent figures who in the recent past were still under the spell of the old stereotypes of confrontational thinking. I would just like to mention an article entitled "Pulling Back From the Brink of the Abyss" published last year in the U.S. journal ATLANTIC by a team of 10 authors, all of whom, including McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith formerly held very prominent posts in the U.S. Administration.

They expressed themselves in favor of the United States and NATO pledging no first use of nuclear weapons and withdrawing all nuclear systems from forward-based positions. These leaders went on to say: "The policy of no first use of nuclear weapons unquestionably presupposes the renunciation of the strategic defense initiative. The danger of SDI consists in the fact that it proposes a technical solution to a problem that is essentially political: /In the nuclear age there can be no security either East or West unless this security is mutual/ (my emphasis -- Yu. Zh.) [Slantlines denote boldface as published]

There was also a very weighty and convincing ring to the recent collective statement of six former U.S. defense secretaries, C. Weinberger's predecessors, in defense of the ABM Treaty and against attempts to torpedo it for the sake of the implementation of the notorious program of preparations for "Star Wars."

The conquest of people's minds by the new thinking is even more noticeable in Europe, fated to turn into a heap of ashes in the event of a nuclear war. On 23 March, for instance, the British Labor Party issued a program document entitled "Europe: The New Detente" that clearly states: "Just like our socialist colleagues in the FRG, who have elaborated unique agreements with the ruling party in the GDR, Labor will conduct talks with the political forces in East Europe about new spheres of cooperation."

The program defines specific tasks of this cooperation in questions of security, the economy, science, trade, environmental protection, and the humanitarian sphere. All these tasks virtually coincide with the program for ensuring universal security put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress.

The Social Democratic Party in the FRG occupies the same positions. They also find expression in the speeches of many prominent figures in West Europe belonging to parties of different political persuasions, including ruling parties.

There are still many difficulties and obstacles on the path toward the humanization of international relations, beginning with attempts on the part of the U.S. ruling circles to hamper the dialogue by refusing visas to Soviet citizens and ending with persisting fears of Western citizens confused by anti-Soviet propaganda who still see the USSR as an "enemy." Nonetheless, considerable progress can already be registered along the path to the establishment of civilized, human relations between states and peoples. And we may be sure that great successes are yet to be achieved along this path in the future.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1495

RELATED ISSUES

WARSAW PACT INITIATIVES RECALLED ON 32D ANNIVERSARY

TASS Commentator

LD121855 Moscow TASS in English 1836 GMT 12 May 87

["Commentary on the 32d Anniversary of Warsaw Treaty"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Thirty-two years ago, on May 14, 1955, a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance was signed by representatives of European socialist countries in the capital of People's Poland.

It has become known as the Warsaw Treaty which marked the beginning of a defensive alliance of the fraternal socialist countries.

The main purpose of the Warsaw Treaty organization is to protect the peaceful creative labour and historical gains of the peoples of the socialist communist. This is a military and political alliance of a new type: Its task is to preserve peace, and not to prepare for war.

Founded in reply to the 'cold war' launched by the United States and to active preparations for an aggression by the countries of the North Atlantic Bloc, the Warsaw Treaty organization contributes to maintaining the strategic balance in Europe and is a powerful factor in stabilising the military and political situation in the world.

The Warsaw Treaty member states both jointly and separately make persistent efforts towards strengthening peace and international security and towards curbing the dangerous arms race.

The socialist community ardently supported the Soviet programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the turn of the century, the programme which was put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), on January 15, 1986, and the USSR's proposals on complete elimination of medium-and-shorter-range missiles in Europe.

On the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the signing of the Warsaw Treaty, Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, president of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, came forward with new large-scale initiatives aimed at strengthening security in Europe.

The aim of the Polish proposal is to lower the level of military confrontation in the zone which covers the territories of nine countries: the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland as well as the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Denmark.

Subsequently the zone could be extended to cover the whole of Europe -- from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. The Polish plan envisages a gradual withdrawal of and cuts in jointly agreed upon shorter-range types of nuclear arms as well as conventional arms, first of all, those possessing the maximum destructive power and accuracy and capable of serving a sudden attack.

So, the proposals are aimed at stabilising the situation in Europe, at ruling out unpredictability in the development of events on the European Continent, and at reducing the temptation of some 'hot heads' to stretch out their hands towards the nuclear button in a crisis situation.

For the first time the plan to strengthen stability in Europe contains a proposal to change the nature of military doctrines so that they could be mutually recognised as being exclusively defensive ones.

And finally, the Jaruzelski plan in development of the Helsinki agreement envisages new security-and confidence-building measures with the use of national and international verification means, including on-site inspections.

To set the military potentials of the two blocs, including nuclear ones, as wide apart as possible, as is envisaged in Poland's comprehensive plan, is consonant with the idea of a nuclear-free Europe.

The implementation of the plan would considerably reduce the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war. The 'flexible response' concept adopted in NATO envisages a first use of nuclear weapons by NATO countries at the earliest stage of any conflict in Europe.

The initiative proposed by the leader of the Polish People's Republic is undoubtedly a substantial contribution to the development of the European security concept adopted by the Warsaw Treaty member states.

The initiative accords with the spirit of restructuring international relations with due regard for the dangerous realities of the nuclear missile age, and gives a new stimulus to the entire process of limiting and reducing the armed forces and armaments on the European Continent.

The countries of the socialist community in Europe approach the 32nd anniversary of the signing of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance united in their views and proceeding along the road of ensuring peace and security on the continent.

This is also illustrated by the GDR's and Czechoslovakia's initiatives concerning the establishment of a nuclear free corridor in central Europe, by Bulgaria's and Romania's proposals on a nuclear and chemical-weapons-free zone in the Balkans as well as by the decisions of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states on security-building measures in Europe.

Soviet people support the fraternal socialist countries' proposals aimed at ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war. They are ready to take all necessary actions for the proposals to be implemented.

Deputy Chief of Staff

LD111326 Moscow TASS in English 1048 GMT 11 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS -- The Warsaw Treaty organisation, born as a reply measure to the aggressive intrigues by the NATO bloc, stood the test of time with honour and confirmed that it is the shield against which the designs by imperialist claimants to world domination, which are perilous to the cause of peace and socialism, break, Colonel-General Vladimir Verevkin-Rakhalskiy, first deputy chief of staff of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty organisation, writes in an article for TASS in connection with the 32nd anniversary of this organisation marked on May 14.

On signing a protocol on extending the Warsaw Treaty in April 1985, the highest party functionaries and statesmen of the fraternal states noted that it was to serve in the future as well, as long as their existed the aggressive NATO bloc, a dependable instrument of enhancing international security.

The military commander recalls the important peace initiatives launched by the treaty member countries. He writes that they stand for a simultaneous disbandment of the Warsaw Treaty organisation and the North Atlantic bloc and as a first step -- for dissolving their military organisations.

Meetings among the commander-in-chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and working groups of experts, on issues of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, set up within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, could have a considerable role to play in easing world tensions if the NATO leaders agreed to them.

But the peace moves by the Warsaw Treaty members states run up against counteraction on the part of imperialism's militarist forces, the colonel-general points out. The main efforts of the United States and NATO are aimed at acquiring military preponderance over the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty.

There has been no slackening in the efforts of U.S. imperialism to achieve world domination. In so doing, it shifted the centre of gravity towards the military field. The socialist countries cannot treat all this indifferently. They do not seek military superiority but will not allow the military-strategic parity between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO to be upset.

/8309

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET ADMIRAL DISCUSSES SOVIET, U.S. NAVAL POLICIES

PM181422 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 May 87 First Edition p 5

["Evil Intentions and Irrefutable Facts: Answers by Fleet Admiral N.I. Smirnov, First Deputy Commander in Chief of the USSR Navy, to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Questions"--date, place not given]

[Text] [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In the West statements are made in which the Soviet Union is accused of naval expansion in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. What can you say about that?

[Smirnov] The Soviet Union is a maritime power, its shores are washed by three oceans. The presence of Soviet ships in their waters is due to the need to protect our sea borders. This applies fully to the Pacific Fleet, which, like the other Soviet fleets, is equipped with modern ships and combat hardware.

At the same time I wish to stress that the Soviet Navy does not constitute a threat to anyone's security or sovereignty. It fulfills purely defensive functions. The presence of Soviet ships in certain regions of the world's oceans is an enforced countermeasure to the expansionist U.S. policy. This applies in particular to the Indian Ocean, where there is a small detachment of our ships to safeguard the Soviet state's interests.

It is well known to the world public that it is not the Soviet Union, but the United States that constantly builds up its Armed Forces groupings in Asia and the Pacific and is seeking to pull together a military alliance of Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul. The strike forces of the U.S. 7th Fleet are deployed in close proximity to the shores of the USSR and the other Asian socialist countries at bases in Alaska, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. At exercises and maneuvers they rehearse frankly aggressive, offensive operations. The United States also keeps a fairly powerful aircraft carrier assault group permanently in the Indian Ocean.

In the desire to distract the world public's attention from the military preparations of the United States and its allies, U.S. propaganda deliberately misrepresents the reasons for the presence of Soviet ships outside the USSR's coastal waters and tries to represent this as Soviet expansion.

But today such false assertions do not work. The peoples of the Asian countries see the USSR as an active and consistent fighter for disarmament and the building of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons. It is the Soviet state that has recently offered a number of large-scale initiatives aimed at settling the problems of the Asian-Pacific region, lowering the level of military activeness in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, reducing armed forces and nuclear and conventional arms, eliminating military bases and facilities on other countries' territories, and developing equal, mutually advantageous cooperation.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Western propaganda has recently been making a lot of noise about the fact that there is a Soviet naval base on SRV territory, constituting a threat to the security of the countries of Asia and the Pacific. What lies behind this ballyhoo?

[Smirnov] This question is in a way a continuation of the first question. The West is indeed making a lot of noise about Cam Ranh, but, as the Oriental proverb has it, the eye sees the truth, and the ear hears a lie. This is the truth.

On the Cam Ranh Peninsula, which is what we are talking about, there is in operation a temporary material and technical supply point for the ships of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, by agreement with the SRV Government. It is intended for the replenishment of stocks for fuel, food, and water, the carrying out of minor repairs, and the provision of leisure facilities for personnel during brief calls by Soviet ships and vessels on passages from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and back. We rent no territory in Cam Ranh, the Soviet ships calling at the port use the same wharves as SRV ships. Security at the port is carried out by the Vietnamese.

The question may arise: How does a material and technical supply point differ from a military base? This can be seen from the example of the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines.

This major U.S. naval base is intended to provide backup for the activity of the ships, aircraft, and marine units of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The United States has rented the territory of its base from the Philippines since 1947. Stationed here are: U.S. Navy command headquarters for the Philippines; the headquarters of the operational formation of surface ships and fleet service forces in the Western Pacific.

The Subic Bay naval base has more than 20 wharves with a total length of 9,000 meters, which makes it possible simultaneously to base 30-35 warships of the main classes, including 2 multipurpose aircraft carriers. There is also a supply dump which is reckoned to be one of the biggest such facilities outside the United States, and can supply ships and aircraft of any type within the 7th Fleet. The colossal capacity of the oil reservoirs (some 400,000 tonnes) and the ammunition dump (more than 50,000 tonnes) located on the base's territory makes it possible to satisfy two-thirds of the requirements of the 7th Fleet's ships and aircraft for combat operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. There are well known reports on the siting of U.S. nuclear weapons on Philippine territory, too.

The U.S. naval base has a ship repair yard that meets 65 percent of the fleet's repair requirements. Moreover the base has a medical center and hospital, Marine barracks, housing, and leisure zones for personnel from the fleet and the naval aviation. Incidentally, Philippine ships can call at the base only with the permission of the U.S. command.

It should be noted that the United States has set up and has today on the territory of Asian and Pacific countries a total of around 300 different military bases and facilities. So it is not hard to see where the threat to the security and sovereignty of the region's countries really comes from.

The Soviet Union is a committed supporter of the elimination of naval bases on other countries' territories, and therefore has no intention of turning the Cam Ranh material and technical supply point into a naval base of its own. As M.S. Gorbachev has said, if the United States renounced its military presence in, say, the Philippines, we would respond accordingly.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Representatives of a number of Western states try to make out that agreements in the sphere of fisheries concluded by the USSR with certain countries in the South Pacific will lead to those countries becoming support bases for the Soviet Navy. How can these fabrications be characterized?

[Smirnov] I can say categorically that fishing in foreign economic zones in any region of the world's oceans has no connection whatever with the activity of our Navy.

As for the agreements the editorial office mentions in its question, it is well known that the conclusion of such agreements is provided for by international law with a view to ensuring that all states have access to surpluses within the permitted catch in the economic zones of littoral states in any regions. This practice of making agreements is encouraged by the United Nations and other international organizations. Therefore the West's fabrications, apart from attempting to discredit the Soviet Union's actions, in effect cast aspersions on the established norms of international cooperation among states on questions of the utilization of the resources of the world's oceans.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In recent years U.S. military activeness and in particular the activity of the U.S. Navy in the Asian and Pacific region has increased constantly. Why is this?

[Smirnov] The Asian and Pacific region, in terms of its military-strategic significance, is regarded by the U.S. military-political leadership as the next most important possible theater of war after Europe and the Atlantic. Therefore, according to Secretary of State G. Shultz, America's interests in the region "require a permanent and impressive U.S. presence in all zones of the Pacific Ocean."

At present the U.S. Pacific Fleet has all the components of a modern navy. It numbers some 180 warships, more than 1,400 planes and helicopters, and two expeditionary divisions of Marines. In line with the provisions of its doctrine of "direct confrontation," the United States is stepping up the activeness of its naval forces near the Soviet Far East. In recent years various assault groupings of the U.S. Navy have been in operation off the USSR's shores almost constantly, rehearsing options for the most effective utilization of forces for a surprise attack on the Soviet Union in the initial phase of war. Among such measures are, for instance, the annual exercise "Team Spirit," "Fleetex," "Brim Frost," and others.

In general the growing military activeness by the United States and its partners in the Asian and Pacific region and the rise in the level of daily activity of assault groups of their naval forces in regions close to the Soviet Pacific Fleet bases are a concrete expression of the aggressive military-strategic concept of "forward marine borders."

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What can you tell us about the so-called "new naval strategy" the U.S. Navy has recently been intensively rehearsing at naval exercises and maneuvers?

[Smirnov] The "new naval strategy" of the United States is a component part of its military doctrine of "direct confrontation" with the USSR. What it amounts to is to considerably increase the offensive potential of the U.S. Navy within the general system of military operations, ensure its superiority at sea through a quantitative and qualitative increase in strike facilities, and ultimately to establish control by the naval forces of the United States and its partners in all "vitally important" regions of the world -- the North Atlantic, the Pacific and Indian oceans, and the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas. What is most important, according to one of the originators of this strategy, former U.S. Secretary of the Navy J. Lehman, is that the U.S. naval forces should be prepared to wage offensive operations against the USSR in its own territorial waters and to strike targets located deep within Soviet territory. To this end the U.S. Navy, together with its allies, is intensively rehearsing the provisions of this "naval strategy" at exercises and maneuvers both in Europe and the Atlantic and in the Far East, and has concentrated in close proximity to the USSR's territory assault groupings commensurate with wartime groupings.

What is the danger in this U.S. strategy? The danger is that it leads to the further intensification of the aggressiveness of the U.S. Navy, a rise in the level of the sides' military confrontation in various regions of the world, and in increase in the potential for military conflicts within those regions.

In these conditions the USSR and the other socialist countries are forced to take appropriate measures to ensure their own security and maintain the military equilibrium.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRC ENVOY TO UN URGES U.S., USSR TO LEAD IN DISARMAMENT

OW070039 Beijing XINHUA in English 0016 GMT 7 May 87

[Text] United Nations, May 6, (XINHUA) — China today urged the Soviet Union and the United States to take the lead in reducing their armaments.

Speaking at a meeting of the U.S. Disarmament Commission, Fan Guoxiang, Chinese ambassador for disarmament affairs, noted that in the world today only the two superpowers were capable of waging another world war. So they should follow the logic by "taking the lead" in reducing their armaments, particularly their nuclear armaments.

He said, "The United States and the Soviet Union should be the first to halt the test, production and deployment of all kinds of nuclear weapons and to drastically reduce and destroy all kinds of such weapons deployed at home and abroad, so as to create conditions for other nuclear powers to participate in the process of nuclear disarmament."

"This is the only realistic and practical approach towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear arms," he said, adding that China, as a nuclear state, would by no means shirk its own responsibility for nuclear disarmament, and would continue making contributions to that end.

Speaking on checking the arms race in the outer space, Fan hoped to see the early conclusion of an international convention on the complete elimination of outer space weapons.

The Chinese ambassador stressed it was the nuclear weapons that posed the gravest threat to humanity, and nuclear disarmament could not but be given the highest priority in all disarmament efforts.

He emphasized the importance and urgency of conventional disarmament, saying the international community has every reason to ask the superpowers which possess the largest and most sophisticated conventional arsenals as well as the two military alliances to be the first to reach agreement on drastically reducing their conventional arms, offensive conventional forces first and foremost, with a view to maintaining peace and security in Europe and the world at large.

In his speech, Fan hoped that an agreement on the reduction of military expenditures would be reached at the current annual session of the disarmament commission.

Dealing with verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, a new item on the agenda, Fan said that the establishment of necessary and effective international verification provisions and their perfection would be conducive to confidence building among all parties to disarmament agreements and the strict implementation of such agreements. Verification measures should be made a necessary component of disarmament agreements, he said.

Meanwhile, he added that owing to the sensitive and complex nature of the issue, and in the absence of disarmament accords, it seemed that extensive efforts would still be required to have these basic principles expanded, enriched and detailed for implementation.

Fan said China had consistently pursued an independent foreign policy of peace, and dedicated itself to security an international environment of lasting peace and stability.

While confirming opposition to the arms race and the promotion of disarmament as "an important part of China's independent foreign policy of peace," Fan said the Chinese people and government had been making contributions through their concrete actions to the relaxation of international tension, promotion of disarmament and maintenance of world peace, and they were ready to do still more.

The U.N. Disarmament Commission has been holding its 1987 annual session since Monday. Founded in 1952, the commission is entrusted by the General Assembly with the task of preparing proposals for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments in a coordinated, comprehensive program by stages.

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PRC UN WORKING PAPER ON CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT

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[Text of working paper "Basic Position of the Chinese Delegation on Conventional Disarmament"--XINHUA headline]

[Text] United Nations, May 8 (XINHUA) -- Following is the full text of the working paper "Basic Position of the Chinese Delegation on Conventional Disarmament," which was submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Commission today.

1. While emphasis is made on nuclear disarmament, the importance and urgency of conventional disarmament must not be overlooked. In fact, there exist between them organic relations.

-- Conventional and nuclear armaments form the basic components of the military capacity of both superpowers as well as the two major military alliances that confront each other.

-- With the advance in science and technology, conventional weapons tend to become increasingly lethal and destructive. During the 40 odd years since the second world war, millions of lives have been lost in regional wars and conflicts fought with conventional weapons.

-- There is no insurmountable barrier between a conventional war and a nuclear one. If a conventional war should break out in a region where nuclear and conventional arms are concentrated on a large scale, it is highly possible that it would escalate into a nuclear war.

-- Conventional arms are often used as means of intervention, subversion, aggression and occupation against sovereign states.

-- The lion's share of nearly one trillion U.S. dollars in military expenditure worldwide goes to conventional arms, consuming huge amounts of resources which otherwise might be used to benefit mankind. It is particularly intolerable that the arms race should take away so many valuable resources when the world is still beset with hunger and poverty.

Therefore, it is totally necessary that drastic reduction of conventional armaments should be pursued along with nuclear disarmament.

2. The global conventional arms race is a race between the superpowers which possess the largest and most sophisticated conventional arsenals. Bearing a special responsibility for the process of conventional armaments reductions, these two countries should take the lead in halting forthwith the conventional arms race, particularly the research, development [Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese at 0759 GMT on 9 May provides the following Pinyin transliteration and standard telegraph codes for "research, development": yan jiu fa zhan 4242 4496 4099 1455], testing, production, deployment and stockpiling of new types of conventional weapons, and reducing their conventional armaments and armed forces substantially, first and foremost their new, heavy offensive conventional arms. After reduction takes effect, the weapons involved should be destroyed on the spot while forces disbanded. Neither should be transferred to other areas.

3. The two major military alliances should work to reach agreement through serious negotiations on drastic reduction of conventional armaments in Europe, a region known to have a high concentration of conventional weapons, with a view to achieving a military balance at the lower level. In the meantime, the conventional armaments of the superpowers in other parts of the world should also be substantially reduced. This is essential to world peace and security.

4. The conventional arms of all countries should not be used other than for self-defense. Every country should undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force in its international relations, and from armed intervention, aggression or military occupation against others with its conventional armed forces. All acts of armed intervention, aggression and military occupation against other countries must be stopped, and all troops engaged in aggression or occupation against other countries must be withdrawn. With the progress in conventional disarmament, all troops stationed in other countries should be withdrawn and all military bases in other countries dismantled.

5. Every country is entitled to take part, on an equal footing, in the consideration, negotiation and settlement of the question relating to conventional disarmament.

6. Every conventional disarmament agreement should contain provisions on necessary and effective measures of international verification.

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